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Abstract
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic protocol that enables
parties to compute a function while keeping their data secret. Although
standard MPC is constructed with algebraic procedures and is supposed to
be implemented in computers, there are also MPCs that are implemented
with physical tools instead of computers. Our study deals with card-based
cryptography that realizes MPC using physical cards such as playing cards.
In this thesis, we use two types of cards, ♣ and ♥, whose backsides are the
same, for constructing protocols.
Traditional card-based cryptography is based on the operating model that
assumes all operations are performed publicly, such as on the table. This
model has the advantage of preventing a cheat since all operations are moni-
tored between the players. However, this model also causes the lower bound
of the number of cards for a protocol. The assumption that publishes all
operations restricts a method of expressing the input value secretly to use
face-down cards. Then, at least 2n cards are required for an n-bit input pro-
tocol since two cards are necessary to arbitrarily express a 1-bit value. This
model also requires randomizing operations to be done in public. Traditional
card-based cryptography utilizes “shuffle” to achieve confidentiality even un-
der the condition, which publishes all operations. Shuffle is a card-oriented
randomizing operation that requires its result cannot be identified by all
players, including the player who performed it. On the other hand, algebraic
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MPC usually adopts “private randomness” that assumes each player can pri-
vately generate and use a random number. Shuffle’s assumption has a large
gap from private randomness. Thus, card-based cryptography’s framework
is different from algebraic MPC.
In this thesis, we propose a new card-based cryptography model that
introduces “private permutations (PP),” which is similar to private random-
ness of algebraic MPC. Our model allows a player to use the private area,
such as the behind player’s back, and PP is an operation to permute a card
order privately. Then, PP removes the restriction of having to use face-down
cards for input. That is, in our model, there is a possibility to construct
a protocol with fewer cards than the lower bound of traditional card-based
cryptography. We actually propose several protocols to achieve this.
This thesis is consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is the descriptions of the
background of MPC and card-based cryptography. PP is proposed, and the
notations are introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of this
thesis. Chapters 3–5 are summarized as follows.
Chapter 3: Secure Computing Logic Gates – Logic Fate Protocols
Whose Number of Cards is Less Than The Lower Limit of Tradi-
tional Model
In traditional card-based cryptography, an n-bit input protocol requires a
minimum of 2n cards. On the other hand, PP enables the input value to be
expressed without using face-down cards. Thus PP enables us to construct
a protocol with fewer cards than the lower bound in the traditional card-
based cryptography. Chapter 3 shows that 2-bit input AND, OR, and XOR
protocols can be realized with less than four cards using PP as the input
representation. Note that AND protocol is proposed by Marcedone, Wen,
and Shi [29].
Chapter 4: Secure Computing Threshold Function – Efficient Card-
based Protocols for Majority Votings And The Threshold Function
CONTENTS 3
The three-card AND and OR protocols described in Chapter 3 can be
extended to a 2-input 2-output protocol that simultaneously obtains AND
and OR results, with four cards. We show that 3-input majority voting
can be realized by utilizing this four-card AND/OR protocol without any
additional cards. We also propose a (t, n)-threshold function protocol with
n+2 cards by extending our 3-input majority voting protocols. This protocol
is realized with fewer cards than the lower bound 2n in traditional card-based
cryptography. This result thanks to the input representation by PP, as in
Chapter 3. It also reduces the number of PPs and communications from 4n2
to n and 2n2 to n − 1. PP achieves efficiency not only for basic functions,
such as logic gates but also for advanced functions.
Chapter 5: How to Solve Millionaires ’Problem – Efficient Card-
based Millionaires’ Protocols
To introduce PP, the model of card-based cryptography is closer to that
of algebraic MPC, compared to the one based on shuffle. As a result, it is ex-
pected that ideas can be mutually utilized between card-based cryptography
and algebraic MPC, which have been independently studied. We demon-
strate that a new card-based protocol can be obtained by converting Yao’s
(algebraic) millionaires’ protocol into a card-based protocol. Millionaires’
protocol is a 2m-bit input protocol that aims at comparing two m-bit values.
Our proposed protocol can be easily derived if we understand the essence of
his solution and is considerably simplified, thanks to the card’s property.
Our protocol, obtained from Yao’s protocol, is superior to the existing
protocol regarding the number of PPs and communications. However, the
number of cards exponentially increases. Thus, we propose another new
millionaires’ protocol based on the bitwise comparison. This protocol is also
interesting in the sense that it uses the famous logic puzzle, “The fork in the
road.” Although this protocol succeeded in reducing the number of cards
from our protocol based on Yao’s protocol, it does not reduce below the
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traditional lower bound of cards, i.e., 4m.
We can further reduce the number of cards to six by reusing the cards in
our proposed protocol. This protocol clarifies that the millionaires’ protocol
can be realized with only six cards. This protocol is the most straightforward













































































プロトコルを提案する．提案プロトコルは，有名な論理パズル “The fork in
the road”を用いる点でも興味深い．最終的に，金持ち比べプロトコルをたっ
た 6枚のカードで実現できることを明らかにした．また，秘匿置換および通
信回数に関しても，それぞれ 12m− 10を 2m+1へ，6m− 5を 2mへ削減す
る．これは秘匿置換の有効性を示す最も強力な例となっている．
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1.1 Background onMulti-Party Computation
Cryptography is one of the essential technologies for utilizing the Internet
securely. For instance, the symmetric/public key cryptosystem provides se-
cure communications over the Internet, even in an environment with the
adversary. On the other hand, modern cryptography aims to realize not only
secure communications but also secure computations among distinct parties.
Consider a scenario where distinct parties wish to compute a function,
such as the average and summation, using their private data as the input
values. More precisely, we suppose the case where n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn
hold private data x1, x2, . . . , xn, respectively, and they wish to compute the
value of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without revealing their own data. Multi-
Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic technology that realizes their
wishes. MPC has to fulfill the following two requirements: First, every party
must receive a correct output (correntness). Second, it is necessary that
parties cannot get any information other than the output value (pricacy).
Both correctness and privacy can be easily fulfilled if there is a trusted third
party that takes over the functionality. However, the goal of MPC is to
10
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fulfill the requirements without it, in other words, even if among distrustful
parties. MPC protocols are utilized in various applications, such as electronic
auction [18,42] and electronic voting [5, 6].
The first MPC protocol is the “mental poker” proposed by Shamir, Rivest,
and Adleman in 1979 [53]. It aims to play poker fairly between two people
at a distance over the phone. The theoretical foundation of MPC in the
two-party setting was established by Yao [61] in 1982. After that, Goldreich,
Micali, and Wigderson extended it to the n-party setting [21].
We consider two kinds of adversarial settings, semi-honest and malicious
models.
In the semi-honest adversarial model, it is assumed that adversaries cor-
rectly follow the protocol procedures, but they attempt to extract informa-
tion about the other parties’ inputs from legitimately obtained information.
Hence, this model is also called honest but curious.
On the other hand, the malicious adversarial model allows adversaries to
behave out of protocol procedures. More robust security is guaranteed un-
der the malicious adversarial model rather than the semi-honest adversarial
model.
It is known that achievability of such models depends on the ratio of
corrupted parties, as shown in [4,10,21,50]. These results hold in the stand-
alone model that assumes parties to participate in only one protocol and run
it only once. However, it is usual that several different protocols run at the
same time in the modern implementation. It is known that a protocol that
is secure in the stand-alone model is not always secure under the composi-
tion. A model that guarantees security, even in such a case, is referred to
as Universal Composability (UC) [7, 8]. It is known that any protocols can-
not achieve UC security without the setup assumptions, such as a common
reference string and a public key infrastructure [9].
There are roughly two directions when constructing an MPC protocol.
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One direction is a generic construction, and the other is a specialized con-
struction. The generic construction aims to build a protocol that is available
for an arbitrary function. The famous protocol in this direction is the garbled
circuit, proposed by Yao [62], which is applicable for any Boolean function
in the two-party setting. It is based on the fact that a combination of logic
gates can compute any Boolean function. In this direction, MPC protocols
based on secret sharing [52] and homomorphic encryption [16,20,49] are also
known. For instance, GMW protocol [21], which is available for any functions
in the n-party setting, is based on secret sharing. Also, Ben-or, Goldwasser,
and Wigderson extended it to the information-theoretic model [4].*1
On the other hand, specialized construction aims to build a protocol for
a specific function straightforwardly. The protocols based on this direction
tend to be more efficient than generic solutions. For instance, we consider
Yao’s solution for the millionaires’ problem [61], which determines which of
two values is greater without revealing them, is included in this direction (see
Section 5.2.1 for details). The protocols for mental poker [21, 53], electronic
auction [18], and electronic voting [5,6] are followed in this direction as well.
1.2 Multi-Party Computation Using Physical
Objects
So far, we reviewed the history of standard (or algebraic) MPC that is real-
ized by computers algebraically. Although algebraic MPC is constructed to
be implemented in computers, there are MPCs that are implemented with
physical objects. Such protocols are referred to as physical cryptography [24]
or recreational cryptography [3]. We list several examples of these MPC pro-
*1In this model, the adversary has no computational limit. On the other hand, a model
that limits the ability of adverwaries in (probabilistic) polynomial time Turing machine is
referred to as the computational model.
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tocols in the following.
 Physical cards (card-based cryptography) [12,15,22,43,57]
 Envelopes [17,39,40]
 Cups [17]
 PEZ dispenser [2, 3, 41]
 Dial lock [33]
 15 puzzle [34]
 Random-looking images printed on transparencies (visual cryptogra-
phy) [13,14]
 Physical coins [28]
Utilizing physical assumptions may enable us to design the protocols that
cannot be achieved in the algebraic MPC. Because physical cryptography
can be implemented with human hands and are easy to understand, they
attract research and are useful in education. In this thesis, we focus on
card-based cryptography.
1.3 Background on Card-Based Cryptogra-
phy
Card-based cryptography, proposed by den Boer in 1989 [15], realizes secure
computations by using physical cards. It also employs simple operations
as used in general card games such as permutation, turn face-up/down and
shuffle. Two types of cards, such as ♣ and ♥, are used in general card-based
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cryptography. The backsides of cards are all the same. The number of cards
and shuffles are the standard efficiency measures of a card-based protocol.
A Boolean value is usually represented with the format, 0 7→ ♣♥ and
1 7→ ♥♣. This format is convenient for NOT operation since it can be easily
realized by swapping. An n-bit input protocol requires at least 2n cards
when we adopt this format to the input representation, such as ? ? ∈ {0, 1}.
We call such a method of expressing the input value using face-down cards
“commitment.”
It is essential in card-based cryptography that all operations are assumed
to take place in public, like on a table. This assumption has the advantage
of preventing a cheat since all operations are monitored between the players.
However, this assumption limits the input representation to use the commit-
ment since there is no other way to express an input value secretly. Thus,
n-bit input protocol requires at least 2n cards since at least two cards are
necessary for 1-bit representation, e.g., 0 7→ ♣♥ and 1 7→ ♥♣. Even if
the Boolean values are represented as 0 7→ ♣ and 1 7→ ♥, each player must
possess at least two cards since input values need to be arbitrarily selected.*2
Card-based cryptography has been devoted to secure computation of logic
gates such as AND, XOR, and COPY. OR operation is easily obtained from
an AND operation using NOT operation. Thus, any computation can be
implemented by a combinations of these logic gate protocols [51]. When we
express a function by a combination of logic gates, it is important whether or
not the protocols can be composed with other protocols. Consider the case
where card-based protocol X is composed of another protocol Y . Then the
output of X must be taken over to Y as the input keeping the value secret,
i.e., face-down.
Committed format [12, 43, 57] is a useful definition to simplify the dis-
*2A study exists to use information on the top and bottom of marks such as ♣ and♣
[37]. We do not apply this method and assume that there is only one card orientation.
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cussion about the composition of card-based protocols. We refer that card-
based protocol is in committed format for an encoding ϕ, e.g., 0 7→ ♣♥ and
1 7→ ♥♣, if both input and output formats follow ϕ. On the other hand, a
protocol with different input and output formats is called a non-committed
format protocol. A non-committed format protocol is possible but not ap-
propriate for the composition with other protocols.
Overview of Previous Works: One of the central issue when designing
efficient card-based protocols is to minimize the number of cards required
in the protocol. den Boer proposed a five-card AND protocol in the non-
committed format [15]. Mizuki, Kumamoto, and Sone showed that AND
protocol in the non-committed format can be done with four-card [35]. As
mentioned above, the input value is represented by two cards. Therefore,
their solution is optimal with respect to the number of cards.
The concept of committed format was proposed by Crépeau and Killian
with actually showing ten-card AND and fourteen-card XOR protocols in the
committed format [12]. The optimal XOR protocol in committed format was
proposed by Mizuki and Sone [38]. They proposed six-card AND protocol
in the same paper, i.e., there is room for improvement on the AND proto-
col. It was one of the important open problems in card-based cryptography
whether AND protocol can be realized with a smaller number of cards in the
committed format. Koch, Walzer, and Härtel proved this problem [27]. In
this work, they proposed five-card AND protocol, which always terminates
with a fixed number of steps, and four-card AND protocol, which is the Las
Vegas algorithm,*3 in committed format. In addition, they proved that AND
protocol in committed format could not be realized with four cards without
using the Las Vegas algorithm. In other words, their 5-card AND protocol
is optimal as a protocol with a finite number of steps.
*3Las Vegas algorithm is a randomized algorithm that outputs either the correct result
or information about the failure.
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Efficiency has been improveed for each logic gate, but at least one shuffle
is required for one logic gate*4. Thus, a protocol composed of a combination
of logic gates tends to have a large number of shuffles. There may be more
efficient protocols that are specialized for each function.
Formulation of Operations in Card-Based Cryptography: There are
three operations used in general card-based cryptography: “permutation,”
“turn face-down/up,” and “shuffle.” As mentioned above, all operations are
assumed to be performed in public, including randomizing operattions. How-
ever, in algebraic MPC, we achieve a secure protocol by utilizing the private
randomness, which assume each player can generate and use random number
privately. Thus, it seems that the confidentiality cannot be achieved if all
operations are shown to other players. Shuffle is the key technique to solve
this problem, which is the randomizing operation performed in public. Then,
it is requires that none of the players can identify the result, including the
player performed the shuffle. Mizuki–Shizuya [36] formalized this operation
as follows:
For a card order (α1, α2, . . . , αn), the shuffle operation shuffleΠ,F is a
random variable defined as
shuffleΠ,F(α1, α2, . . . , αn) = πr(α1, α2, . . . , αn) (1.1)
where Π = {π1, π2, . . . , πt} is a set of permutations and F is a probability
distribution on Π. r ∈ {1, . . . , t} is determined according to F . Then, none
of the players identify r that expresses which permutation is selected.
For instance, den Boer [15] used random cut that is cyclic shift shuffle
*4There is also a method to realize card-based protocol for computing circuits with one
shuffle [56]. Since this protocol utilized the techniques of garbled circuit [62], it requires
distinct twenty four cards for each gate. Hence, instead of achieving the minimum number
of shuffles, this protocol requires much more number of cards compared to the protocols
obtained by simply combining the card-based protocols for logical gates.
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to realize the five-card AND protocol. This shuffle is on the following set of
permutations:
Π = {id, (5, 1, 2, 3, 4), (4, 5, 1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 5, 1, 2), (2, 3, 4, 5, 1)}. (1.2)
F is the uniform distribution over Π. Crépeau and Killian [12] also used the
random cut to construct ten-card AND and fourteen-card XOR protocols
in the committed format. It is known that such shuffles that are closed
about permutations and have a uniform distribution can be performed with
human hands [23, 26]. Thus, it is desirable that the shuffle is closed and
uniform [1, 25]. However, even if the shuffle can be performed with human
hands, we need to verify whether it is secure even in public.
In order to reduce the number of cards, a different type of shuffle was
introduced in [35, 38], called random bisection cut. In executing random
bisection cut, even number of cards are divided into two sets consisting of
the same number of cards, and these two sets are exchanged many times
until none of the players can recognize how many times the two sets of cards
are permuted. Hence, π is {id, (v + 1, v + 2, . . . , 2v, 1, 2, . . . , v)} where 2v
is the number of cards and F is the uniform distribution over Π. We note
that the random bisection cut has only two results, unlike the random cut.
Such a shuffle seems unnatural from general card games’ viewpoint, and
there is room to discuss whether it can be securely implemented with human
hands [59,60].
Furthermore, Koch, Walzer, and Härtel introduced unique shuffles whose
result is non-uniform to reduce the number of cards in the AND protocols [27].
For instance, they used a shuffle whose set of permutations is similar to
random bisection cut, but the probabilities were non-uniform such as 1/3
and 2/3. Although their shuffle certainly contribute to protocols’ efficiency,
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Table 1.1: Comparison of MPC Models
Algebraic MPC Public Model (Our) Private Model
Enc/Dec Enc/Dec Turn Face-down/up Turn Face-down/up
Randomization Private Public Private
Communication Use Not use Use
it is much harder to be implemented with human hands.*5
1.4 Motivation
As explained in the previous section, much of previous works for card-based
cryptography are based on the operating model that assumes all operations
are performed in public, such as on the table. We call this model public
model. Public model restricts the expression of input values secretly to use
face-down cards. That is, at least 2n cards are required for an n-bit input
protocol since two cards are necessary to express a 1-bit value arbitrarily.
While public model has the advantage of preventing a player’s malicious
behavior, it causes a lower bound of the number of cards.
Public model also requires randomizing operations to be done in public.
Normally, a probabilistic operation must be executed privately since it is
necessary to conceal the random number from other players. On the other
hand, traditional card-based cryptography achieves confidentiality even un-
der public model by using “shuffle” based on the card-oriented assumption.
Discussion about Shuffles: Shuffle is the most critical operation in card-
based cryptography, which is to randomize a card order in public. den Boer
showed how to compute securely AND protocol utilizing the random cut,
which is one of the shuffles. This shuffle seems practically feasible with human
hands. On the other hand, the special shuffles, such as random bisection cut
*5A method to realize the non-uniform shuffle by using special boxes is proposed in [46].
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and non-uniform shuffles, have a human infeasibility problem. The methods
of human hands implementation were proposed using tools, such as boxes [46]
and a rubber [60], but it is not preferable if we want to execute protocols only
by hands. Such shuffles are mathematically acceptable but not physically
acceptable and thus seem not to be included in card-oriented assumptions.
Also, shuffle is based on the assumption that its result cannot be identified
by human eyes. We note that the protocol’s security cannot be guaranteed
if video filmed shuffle.
Algebraic MPC realizes secure protocols based on private randomness,
which is the assumption that each player can privately generate and use a
random number. On the other hand, card-based cryptography realizes MPC
protocols without private randomness by utilizing the physical assumption,
i.e., by using shuffles. Thus, card-based cryptography framework becomes
different from algebraic MPC’s one because of this card-oriented assumption.
Thus, card-based cryptography has been studied independently to algebraic
MPC and has constructed protocols from scratch.
In traditional card-based cryptography, protocols for logic gates have been
the central concern. This is because a combination of logic gates can compute
any Boolean function, and it is necessary to build a protocol from scratch.
The difference in frameworks of algebraic MPC and card-based cryptogra-
phy under the public model makes card-based cryptography difficult. Thus,
almost all traditional card-based cryptography concentrated on logical gates,
and there are few studies on the specialized construction for advanced func-
tions.
Although the combination of logic gates has the advantege of being gen-
eral, there may be a specific and more efficient construction for each function.
Thus, we focus on the specialized construction for each function to discover
a more efficient protocol.
Proposal of Private Permutations: We propose a new card-based cryp-
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tography model that is naturally derived from the private randomness of
algebraic MPC. Our model, called private model, allows players to use pri-
vate area, such as under the table or behind the player’s back.*6 That is, we
introduce the following two operations into card-based cryptography instead
of shuffle:
 Private Permutation (PP): Permute card order in private area
 Communication: hand over (or send) cards to another player.
In private model, shuffle can be interpreted as a combination of multiple
operations under the semi-honest assumption. For instance, we realize a ran-
dom bisection cut as follows: Alice first generates a random number rA and
permutes bisected cards rA times behind her back, and sends the permuted
cards to the other player, say Bob. Bob privately generates a random number
rB and permutes bisected cards rB times behind his back. If rA and rB are
kept private by Alice and Bob, respectively, this protocol shuffles bisected
cards rA + rB times, and no one can know the number of permutations.
Similarly, other shuffles can be achieved with two PPs and one commu-
nication. Thus, a protocol constructed on public model can also be realized
on private model.
Expected Results on Private model: In private model, operations, in-
cluding input, can be performed privately like algebraic MPC. As a result,
it is possible to break the lower bound of the number of cards in traditional
card-based cryptography. However, security is weakened in the sense that
semi-honest assumption is required.
Card-based cryptography becomes closer to algebraic MPC by removing
the physical assumption of shuffle and introducing private randomness. Table
1.1 summaries the correspondences between the operations of each model and
*6Private randomness in card-based cryptography is introduced independently by Marce-
done, Wen, and Shi [29]. Their protocol is described in Section 3.2.
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algebraic MPC. From this table, we can see that our private model is closer
to algebraic MPC.
As mentioned above, public model requires that all operations, includ-
ing randomizations, are performed in public. This requirement has a large
gap with the private randomness of algebraic MPC. On the other hand, our
private model enables the players to perform privately similar to the private
randomness. It is noteworthy that public model does not have communica-
tion. This is because it is no matter who performs each process in a situation
where all operations are performed in public. Surprisingly, all operations can
be executed by one player in public model. This property has a large gap
with algebraic MPC.
In private model, there is no need to use commitment, i.e., two cards
to express one bit, for input by utilizing PP. For instance, in Chapter 3,
we will express 0 and 1 by do nothing and permute order by PP, which
means no additonal card is necessary to express an input value. Actually,
we can construct an n-bit input protocol with less than 2n cards by utilizing
PP. We show that protocols for logic gates, the threshold function, and the
millionaires’ problem with less than 2n cards in this thesis. These protocols
do not rely on the combination of logic gates. They are specialized for each
function and are more efficient than generic construction. Unfortunately,
our protocols for logic gates cannot be used for the combination with other
protocols. It is future work to verify whether efficiency can be improved even
in general constructions, such as the combination of logic gates.
It is also expected that algebraic MPC’s achievements can be returned
to card-based cryptography by closing the model gap between card-based
cryptography and algebraic MPC. We show that a new card-based proto-
col can be obtained by converting (algebraic) Yao’s millionaires’ protocol to
card-based cryptography. On the contrary, it is expected that card-based
cryptography can help algebraic MPC, which is the future work.
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1.5 Our Results
We propose a new assumption, “private permutation (PP),” as mentioned
in the previous section. PP enables us to the input representation without
using the commitment. As a result, we can construct the protocols with less
than the lower bound of cards in traditional card-based cryptography. We
propose several protocols for demonstrating PP’s power. We summarize our
results in Table 1.2 where n is the number of players and m is the bit length
of players’ inputs.
Chapter 3: We show that an n-input protocol can be constructed with
fewer cards than 2n. In traditional card-based cryptography, it is assumed
that all operations are performed in public. This assumption restricts the
input representation to use two face-down cards. PP removes this restriction
since the input value can be expressed with PP, e.g., defined by permuting
cards if the input value is 0. Doing nothing otherwise.
Chapter 3 shows the following three 2-bit input protocols using PP. Note
that the study of constructing logic gate protocols are fundamental in tradi-
tional card-based cryptography with shuffle.
 3-card AND (proposed by Marcedone et al. [29])
 3-card OR (This work)
 2-card XOR (This work)
First, we show the protocol that is proposed by Marcedone, Wen, and Shi [29].
They succeeded in reducing the number of cards by the same idea to PP,
independently to our work.*7 The 3-card OR protocol is easily derived from
their AND protocol by De Morgan’s laws (described in Section 3.3.1). Also,
*7In [29], PP is realized PP by permuting cards in an empty room.
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we show the XOR protocol can be done with only two cards by a similar
technique in Section 3.3.2.
Chapter 4: Chapter 3 showed that PP works effectively for improving effi-
ciency in basic protocols for logic gates. We offer that PP also works effec-
tively for more advanced functions in this chapter. We propose the following
two protocols.
 3-input majority voting protocol with four cards
 n-input threshold function protocol with n+ 1 cards
The 3-input majority voting protocol aims to obtain the voting result
with three voters who have Boolean inputs while keeping the input values
secret. The threshold function is a Boolean function to determine whether
x1 + x2 + · · · + xn ≥ t where the threshold value 0 ≤ t ≤ n. Note that the
threshold function is a generalization of majority voting.
Our idea is the following: The three-card AND and OR protocols de-
scribed in Chapter 3 can be extended to a 2-input 2-output protocol with
four cards that simultaneously obtains AND and OR results by utilizing the
symmetry between them. Our 3-input majority voting protocol is based on
this four-card AND/OR protocol without any additional cards (described in
Section 4.2). We show the outline of this protocol below:
We utilize the following relational expression.
If c = 0 : a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a ∧ b = 1 (1.3)
If c = 1 : a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ a ∨ b = 1 (1.4)
Four-card AND/OR protocol is used to obtain a ∧ b and a ∨ b. After that,
the third player whose input is c chooses which one outputs by using PP, and
this action is her input. Namely, the third player uses no card to express her
input value.
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The lower bound of the number of cards is six for a 3-bit input protocol
in public model. We propose a protocol that beats the lower bound.
Our 3-input majority voting protocol can be extended to more partici-
pants. Furthermore, the threshold function can be reduced to the majority
voting by fixing some input values. From these facts, we can obtain a pro-
tocol for (t, n)-threshold function for any t and n (described in Section 4.3).
Our protocol is realized with n+1 cards. This result succeeds in reducing the
number of cards to below the traditional lower bound. Also, we evaluate a
card-based protocol by the number of PPs and communications as the com-
putational cost. As described in Section 1.4, a shuffle is interpreted as two
PPs and one communication. We convert a protocol in public model to a pro-
tocol in private model when comparing the efficiency between them. Then,
our threshold function protocol succeeds in reducing the number of PPs and
communications from 4n2 to n and 2n2 to n− 1, respectively. We note that
this protocol is not the general construction, such as the combination of logic
gates but specialized construction for the threshold function.
Chapter 5: By introducing PP, the frame of card-based cryptography be-
comes closer to that of algebraic MPC. To demonstrate this, we show that
a new card-based protocol can be obtained by converting Yao’s (algebraic)
millionaires’ protocol into a card-based protocol (described in Section 5.2)
The millionaires’ protocol is a comparison protocol for two m-bit values. We
note that at least 4m cards are necessary to construct the proposed protocol
in public model since this protocol has 2m-bit input. Our proposed protocol
can be easily derived if we understand the essence of Yao’s protocol. Also,
our protocol is considerably simplified thanks to the property of cards, which
strips away the complexities of the algebraic process. This is the first result
of obtaining a card-based protocol by converting an algebraic protocol. Al-
though this protocol is improved from the viewpoint of the number of PPs
and communications, the number of cards exponentially increases from the
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existing protocol, which is constructed by the combination of logic gates.
Thus, we propose efficient millionaires’ protocols in Section 5.3.2 by us-
ing bitwise representation of input values. First, we propose a millionaires’
protocol with 4m+ 2 cards. Thus, it does not succeed in breaking the lower
bound of the number of cards in public model, although it succeeds in re-
ducing the number of cards the above protocol. We show the outline of this
protocol below:
Let a = (am, . . . , a1) and b = (bm, . . . , b1) be binary inputs. Then, input
values are represented by two card representation as in public model , i.e.,
0 7→ ♣♥ and 1 7→ ♥♣. Thus, 4m cards are used for the input representa-
tion. This protocol adopts the bitwise comparison from the least significant
bit. Then, we want to extract information of the most significant bit that
holds ai 6= bi to determine if a > b. To achieve this, we prepare two additional
cards for the following two roles.
 output card : To be overwritten with bi if ai 6= bi
 dummy card : To be overwritten with bi if ai = bi
We note that bi shows whether ai > bi or not if ai 6= bi. Repeating this record-
ing process up to the most significant bit, the output card has information of
the most significant bit that holds ai 6= bi. Then, the reason why the output
and dummy cards are one card respectively is that one-card representation
is sufficient, such as 0 7→ ♣ and 1 7→ ♥. Namely, bi is recorded as one-card
representation. To realize this process, a player Alice sends her bit ai to the
other player Bob, and Bob compares and overwrites according to the above
rules. Of course, the outline given here does not consider confidentiality. In
the actual protocol, Alice sends ai or ¬ai to achieve confidentiality. It does
not seem that Bob can correctly overwrite in this case. However, our proto-
col provides both the correct overwriting and confidentiality. The interesting
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point is that this protocol’s main idea is related to the famous logic puzzle,
“The fork in the road.” *8
This protocol does not succeed in breaking the lower bound of the num-
ber of cards because input values are expressed as traditional card-based
cryptography, i.e., two cards per bit. We show that further improvement is
possible for the number of cards by applying the idea of expressing the input
values with PP as in Chapters 3 and 4. In the original protocol, overwrit-
ten cards, i.e., output/dummy cards, are discarded without opening since
these cards have input value information. On the other hand, our improved
protocol reuses these discarded cards. Two players randomize the reused
cards each other before reusing them to delete the input value information.
Then, this protocol adopts two-card representation for output/dummy cards
since once-card representation cannot be randomized. The reused cards are
utilizes for expressing players’ input values. As a result, our improvement
enables us to solve the millionaires’ problem with only six cards, which is the
most significant result to show the power of PP (described in Section 5.3.3).
1.6 Organization of This Thesis
The remaining part of this thesis is organized as follows: We introduce several
notations, basic operations of cards, including PP, and the security notion
for card-based cryptography in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents card-based
protocols for logic gates by utilizing PP. In Chapter 4, we first show how to
merge the 3-card AND and three-card OR protocols into 4-card AND/OR
*8 This problem is summarized as follows: An logician finds himself on an island in-
habited by two tribes: liars and truth-tellers. Members of the one tribe always tell the
truth, whereas members of the other tribe always tell lies. The logician reaches a fork in a
road and has to ask a native bystander which branch he should take to reach the village.
He has no way of telling whether the native is a truth-teller or a liar. The logician only
asks one question. From the reply he knows which road to take. What question does he
ask? [19, p.25]
1.6. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 27
protocol. Then, we propose 3-input majority voting protocol and threshold
function protocol based on the 4-card AND/OR protocol. Chapter 5 is de-
voted to the proposal of millionaires’ protocol. We first show how to convert
algebraic Yao’s protocol into a card-based protocol. Then, we propose an-
other millionaires’ protocol that is utilizing the idea of the logic puzzle “The
fork in the road.” We conclude this thesis in Chapter 6.
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Table 1.2: Summary of Our Results
Protocol References # of PPs # of Comm. # of Cards
OR Mizuki et al. [35] 3 2 4
Sect. 3.3.1 2 1 3
XOR Mizuki–Sone [38] 2 1 4
Sect. 3.3.2 2 1 2
Majority Voting Nishida et al. [45] 5 3 8
with 3 inputs Sect. 4.2 3 2 4
Threshold Nishida et al. [44] 4n2 2n2 2n+ 2
Function Sect. 4.3 n n− 1 n+ 1
Nishida et al. [44] 6m− 5 12m− 10 4m+ 2
Millionaires’ Sect. 5.2 1 2 2 · 2m
Problem Sect. 5.3.2 2m 2m+ 1 4m+ 2
Sect. 5.3.3 2m 2m+ 1 6
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and Basic Operations in Card-
based Cryptography
In card-based cryptography, we normally use two types of cards such as ♣
and ♥.*1 We assume that two cards with the same mark are indistinguish-
able. We also assume that all cards have the same design on their reverse
sides, and that they are indistinguishable and represented as ? . While some
studies uses information on the top and bottom of marks such as ♣ and
♣
[37], we do not apply this method and assume that there is only one card
orientation. The Boolean values 0 and 1 are encoded as ♣♥ and ♥♣, re-
spectively. Note that we regard a card order as a vector. In this thesis, we use
the following fundamental card operations [36]. Note that these operations
are executed publicly.
 Face up: ? 7→ ♣, ? 7→ ♥
*1There are also researches that uses different cards such as ordinary playing cards
[31,43], polygonal cards [54] and polarizing plates [55].
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 Face down: ♣ 7→ ? , ♥ 7→ ?
 Public permutation: e.g., ♣♣♥ 7→ ♥♣♣
A pair of face-down cards for the Boolean value x ∈ {0, 1}, is called
commitment. In particular, the permutation for a commitment is referred to
as swap.
For simplicity, ♣ and ♥ are represented as ♣ and ♥, respectively.
2.2 Shuffles and Private Permutation
2.2.1 Shuffles Used in Previous Works
den Boer utilized the shuffle, called random cut, to realize five-card AND
protocol in non-committed format [15]. The random cut is one of the shuf-
fles that repeats the procedure of moving the first card to the end until all
players cannot specify the result. Crepeau–Kilian [12], Niemi–Renvall [43],
and Stiglic [57] also used this shuffle to construct card-based AND protocol,
in committed format with ten-card, twelve-card, and eight-card respectively.
After that, Mizuki and Sone succeeded in reducsing the number of cards by
introducing the new shuffle random bisection cut [38].
Random Bisection Cut. This is a key technique to realize efficient card-based
protocols for logic gates, e.g., four-card AND protocol in non-committed
format [35] and six-card AND protocol in committed format [38], which is
described as follows:
For a positive integer v, suppose that there is a sequence of 2v face-down
cards. Denote the left and right halves by u⃗1 and u⃗2, respectively. Namely,
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we define
v cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:u⃗1
v cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:u⃗2
. (2.1)
Then, u⃗1 and u⃗2 are interchanged or left unchanged with probability 1/2.
Depicting this by using figures, one of either
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
u⃗1
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
u⃗2
or ? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
u⃗2
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
u⃗1
(2.2)
is selected with a probability 1/2. This operation, called random bisection
cut, is executed in public, but it is assumed that no player knows whether
one of the above is selected.
Although the random bisection cut contributes to the efficiency of card-
based protocols, it is arguable whether this shuffle, which has only two results,
can realize uniformly at random with human hands in public [44,59].
Non-uniform Shuffle. While it is assumed that the results are chosen uni-
formly at random in the random cut and random bisection cut, there are
also shuffles that are assumed to be the results are chosen with non-uniform
probability. Koch, Walzer, and Härtel utilized such non-uniform shuffles to
reduce the number of cards further [27]. However, it is controversial whether
non-uniform shuffles can be implemented with only human hands [46].
2.2.2 Proposal of Private Permutations
The shuffle is regarded as a convenient randomization technique for imple-
menting card-based cryptography. However, the assumption of shuffle is
card-oriented, as is pointed out in Section 1.4. The shuffle is a key technique
that realizes card-oriented protocols, but it also causes a gap with algebraic
32 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
MPC. Concretely, algebraic MPC cannot accept the following assumptions:
 All players cannot identify the random number even if it is generated
in public area.
 Every player cannot know the random number which is generated by
him/herself.
Both assumptions are natural for real shuffles, e.g., in playing cards. On the
other hand, the shuffle used in card-based cryptography does not completely
randomize cards, unlike used in general card games. Thus the shuffle used
in card-based cryptography has a problem in them feasibility even if it is
accepted that they are based on card-oriented properties.
In order to solve these problems, we introduce new card operations pri-
vate permutation (PP) and communication instead of the shuffle. PP allows
us to construct card-based protocols with the private randomness like alge-
braic MPC, e.g., by permuting cards behind the player’s back. It becomes
necessary to clarify who perform the operation as a result of introducing the
private randomness in card-based cryptography. Thus we introduce an oper-
ation to hand cards to other players, i.e., communication, in order to make
it clear who owns the cards. As a result, shuffles are not interpreted as one
operation but as being realized by multiple operations in our model.
Concretely, a random bisection cut by Alice can be realized as follows:
Alice first generates a random number rA and permutes the bisected cards
rA times behind her back and sends the permuted cards to the other player,
say Bob. Bob privately generates a random number rB and permutes the
bisected cards rB times behind his back. If rA and rB are kept private by
Alice and Bob, respectively, this protocol permutes the bisected cards rA+rB
times, and no one can know the number of permutations.
We fomalize PP as follows: For a positive integer t, let c⃗ ∈ {♣,♥}t be
a vector consisting of t face-down cards. For a set Pt of all permutations
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over [t] := {1, 2, . . . , t}, let Rt ⊂ Pt be a set of possible permutations. We
also define Rt = {π0, π1, . . . , π|Rt|−1}, where πi denotes a permutation over
[t]. Then, for a positive integer t and a set of possible permutations Rt, the
private permutation is defined as follows:
PP
[t]
Rt(c⃗, s) := πs(c⃗), s = 0, 1, . . . , |Rt| − 1. (2.3)
Note that the same function was introduced in the previous works [27,36]
although we impose an additional assumption on this function. Namely, we
assume that the player executing PP
[t]
Rt keeps s secret, whereas he/she makes
the other parameters public, which is easy to realize by permuting the cards
behind the player’s back. We note that, not only the random bisection cut,
but also several different types of shuffles, e.g., in [43], can be realized by
PPs by specifying Rt appropriately.
For instance, consider the set of permutations capable of randomly inter-
changing the first and the latter halves of a vector as follows: For a positive
integer v, let Rbc2v := {π0, π1} ⊂ P2v where
π0 := (1, . . . , v, v + 1, . . . , 2v), and π1 := (v + 1, . . . , 2v, 1, . . . , v). (2.4)
Eq. 2.4 means that π0(c⃗) = (u⃗1, u⃗2) and π1(c⃗) = (u⃗2, u⃗1) for c⃗ := (u⃗1, u⃗2)




(c⃗, s) = πs(c⃗) where s is chosen from {0, 1} uniformly at random and
it is known only by the player executing this operation. In executing the
random bisection cut, for a card order c⃗, Alice executes PP
[2v]
Rbc2v
(c⃗, rA) =: c⃗′ by




(c⃗′, rB) by using his private randomness rB ∈ {0, 1}.
In most of previous works, all operations are performed in public so as
to avoid cheating. On the other hand, our card-based protocols are realized
under the semi-honest model since we adopt the operation of executing in
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player’s private area.*2
Efficiency Measures. Most of the previous work, e.g., [36,54], considered the
number of shuffles as the computational complexity since shuffle is the most
time-consuming operation. On the other hand, in this thesis we consider
that the computational complexity is evaluated by the number of PPs and
communications since such measures are suitable for algebraic MPC. In this
thesis, successive PPs executed by one player without communication and/or
face up is counted as one PP since the composition of permutations is also
regarded as a permutation and the subsequent private permutation can be
executed at once behind the player’s back.
2.3 Example: Six-card AND Protocol
In order to clarify the difference between shuffles and PPs, we show two
kinds of implementations of six-card AND protocol [38], namely, we show
the protocol realized by using shuffles (Protocol 1) and PPs (Protocol 2),
respectively. Note that all operations in protocols 1 are executed in public.
On the other hand, there are both private and public operations in protocol
2, so that it needs to be clearly distinguished whether the operation is private
or public and who perform the operations.
We assume that two players, Alice and Bob, hold secret bits a ∈ {0, 1} and
b ∈ {0, 1}, respectively, and they wish to calculate a ∧ b without revealing
information of their inputs. We introduce the six-card AND protocol [38]
realizing this requirement.
*2It is known that malicious behaviors can be detected by having players act as monitors
in a particular protocol [2].
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2.4 Security Notion
Throughout this thesis, we assume that both Alice and Bob are semi-honest
players. Following [11], we introduce the security notion (perfect secrecy) of
card-based cryptography for the millionaires’ problem.
In defining the security of card-based cryptography, view plays a key role.
View is roughly defined to be a vector of random variables*3 to the data
that each player can obtain in the protocol. Specifically, view includes the
randomvariables corresponding to the input of the player, the output of the
protocol, public information all players can gain, and random values which
are used when the player makes a random choice.
For i ∈ [m], let xi be n-bit integers representing the input values of
player Pi. The common output of the protocol for all players is represented
as χ(x1, x2, . . . , xm). The information obtained by each player in the protocol
can be classified into private information denoted by ri for each i ∈ [m], and
public information denoted by λ.
Hence, view of Pi can be described as the sequence of random variables
corresponding to her/his input value xi, output of the protocol, private infor-
mation ri and public information λ. The private information ri is the random
number generated by Pi for PPs. The public information is the cards that the
players made public by turning them face-up. Note that, in algebraic MPC,
view includes information that each player receives via private channel, but in
card-based cryptography, there is no private channel. Only face-up cards can
reveal information, and hence, we can define the face-up cards are included
in the view as public information. Let Xi, Ri, and Λ be random variables
corresponding to the values xi, ri, and λ, respectively. Then, the views of Pi
*3Throughout the thesis, random variables are represented by capital letters. The prob-
ability that a random variable X takes a value x is represented by Pr{X = x} which is
also written as PX(x) for short. Mathematically, a random variable is defined to be a map
from probability space to the set of real numbers. However, for simplicity, we allow the
cards ♣,♥ to be treated as the values of random variables.
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are represented as (Xi, χ(X1, X2, . . . , Xn), RA,Λ).
Intuitively, if private and public information of Pi can be simulated from
her/his input and output for all i ∈ [m], we can say that no information is
contained in the private and public information other than her/his input and
output. Hence, we can formulate perfect secrecy of card-based cryptography
for the millionaires’ problem as follows:
Definition 1 (Perfect secrecy) Consider a card-based protocol for players
P1, P2, . . . , Pm. We say that the card-based protocol is perfectly secure if for
all i ∈ [m], there exist simulators Si such that for all possible input values of
the protocol, it holds that
Si(xi, χ(x1, x2, . . . , xm))
perf
≡ (a, χ(x1, x2, . . . , xm), RA,Λ) (2.7)
where U
perf
≡ V means that the each probability distribution QU , QV corre-
sponding to the random variables U and V , respectively, are perfectly the
same.
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Protocol 1 Six-card AND Protocol [38] (Using Shuffle)
1) Set up the initial value (a, 0, b) represented by the commitments of six
cards.
2) Apply π := (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6) to the card order prepared in the step 1).
3) Execute a random bisection cut for these six cards.
4) Apply π−1 := (1, 4, 2, 3, 5, 6) to the card order obtained in step 3). Note
that the result of 2)–4) is either (a, 0, b) or (¬a, b, 0) with probability
1/2.
5) Open the first bit. If it is 0, then output the second bit. Otherwise,
output the third bit. Graphically, this step is represented as
♣♥
output︷︸︸︷
? ? ? ? or ♥♣ ? ?
output︷︸︸︷
? ? .
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Protocol 2 Six-card AND Protocol [38] (Using PPs)
1) Set up the initial value c = (a, 0, b) represented by the commitments of
six cards. First, one of both players, say Alice, holds these six cards.
2) Alice applies π = (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6) to c in public. Let the sequence exe-
cuted this permutation be c′.
3-i) Alice privately executes the following PP with respect to Rbc6 which is





where Rbc6 := {π0, π1} is given by (2.4) with v = 3 and rA ∈ {0, 1} is
chosen uniformly at random.
3-ii) Alice sends cA to Bob.





where rB ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random.
4) Bob executes π−1 = (1, 4, 2, 3, 5, 6) to cB in public.
5) Bob reveals the first bit in public. If it represents 0, then output the





In traditional card-based cryptography, it is necessary for an n-bit input
protocol to use at least 2n cards since two cards are required for the arbitrary
expression of a 1-bit value. This restriction is due to the assumption that
all operations are performed in public, and as a result, face-down cards are
the only way to secure input representation. On the other hand, we remove
this assumption by introducing PP. PP allows us to represent an input value
in another way, e.g., privately permute cards only when the input value is 1
and makes it possible to construct a protocol with fewer cards than the lower
bounds of traditional card-based cryptography.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that 2-bit input protocols can be con-
structed with less than four cards. Proposed protocols are for logic gates,
which are the main focus of study in card-based cryptography. First we
describe the three-card AND protocol proposed by Marcedone, Wen, and
Shi [29]. They introduced the private operation to card-based cryptography
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Table 3.1: Summary of Our Results in Chap. 3
Protocol References # of PPs # of comm. # of Cards
AND Mizuki et al. [35] 3 2 4
Marcedone et al. [29] 2 1 3
OR Mizuki et al. [35] 3 2 4
This work [Sect. 3.3] 2 1 3
XOR Mizuki–Sone [38] 2 1 4
This work [Sect. 3.3] 2 1 2
independently and succeeded in reducing the number of cards. We construct
three-card OR protocol by applying De Morgan’s law to their protocol. As a
result, our protocol becomes symmetrical to three-card AND protocol. Also,
we show that XOR protocol can easily be obtained with only two cards.
We summarize our result in Table 3.1. In this chapter, let a and b be the
binary inputs of Alice and Bob, respectively.
Organization: In Section 3.2 we introduce the three-card AND protocol
proposed by Marcedone, Wen, and Shi [29]. Based on their protocol, we
propose three-card AND and two-card OR protocols in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 is the summary of this chapter.
3.2 Our Idea: Three-card AND Protocol
In the Epilogue in [29] (Solution B), the three-card AND protocol is proposed




(c⃗, b) := c⃗′ (3.1)
where Rbc2 := {π0, π1}, π0 := (1, 2) and π1 := (2, 1).
*1Slightly modified for later discussion, but essentially the same as the protocol in [29].
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Protocol 3 Three-card AND Protocol [29]
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}.
Setup: Alice has ♣♥. Bob has ♣.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♣ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♥ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, places face-down ♣ to the left side of the receiced card.
 If a = 1, places face-down ♣ to the right side of the receiced card.
3) Open the right card in public area.
 If this card is ♣, then a ∧ b = 0.
 If this card is ♥, then a ∧ b = 1.
Table 3.2 shows the correspondence between the card order at the end of
step 2) and the output of the protocol. Subscripts of ♣ and ♥ indicate the
player who had the card originally.*2
We also note that Bob’s input at step 3) in Protocol 3 is not represented
by the suit of the card but is represented by the action taken by Bob, i.e.,
Bob’s value corresponds to his choice of left or right where he places his ♣.
Table 3.2: Three-card AND protocol
a b Step 2) Output
0 0 ♣Bob ♣Alice 0 (♣Bob)
0 1 ♣Alice ♣Bob 0 (♣Alice)
1 0 ♣Bob ♥Alice 0 (♣Bob)
1 1 ♥Alice ♣Bob 1 (♥Alice)
*2Hereafter, we remove the frame of cards for simplicity.
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In this study, we utilize this idea to express a player’s input by his/her action
and succeed in reducing the number of cards compared to previous work.
Security Proof of three-card AND protocol: We present a brief overview of the
security proof for Protocol 3, which will be useful to understand the security
of the protocols proposed hereafter.
Since we compute AND, the player who inputs 1 can uniquely determine
the other player’s input at the end of the protocol. Meanwhile, for the player
who inputs 0, no information must leak out to the player, which we have to
check. When Alice inputs a = 0 (♣), the output is either ♣Alice or ♣Bob,
which is opened by Bob and is indistinguishable from Alice. When Bob
inputs b = 0, he places his ♣ on the left, and he simply shows his card to
Alice. Hence, he obtains no information on Alice’s input, which is discarded
at the end of the protocol.
It is clear that no information is obtained by the players other than Alice
and Bob (if such players exist) because the only information they can get is
the output. □
3.3 Logic Gate Protocols
In this section, we show the two types of card-based protocol for OR and
XOR operations. We first show how to obtain three-card OR protocol based
on the three-card AND protocol by De Morgan’s law. After that, we propose
two-card XOR protocol.
3.3.1 Three-card OR Protocol
Although the concept of PPs is implicitly used in [29], this paper only concen-
trated on the construction of card-based AND protocols, and no card-based
protocols were shown for the other logic gates. Hereafter, we show card-based
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Protocol 4 Three-card OR Protocol
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}.
Setup: Alice has ♣♥. Bob has ♣.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♥ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♣ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, places face-down ♣ to the right side of the receiced card.
 If a = 1, places face-down ♣ to the left side of the receiced card.
3) Open the left card in public area.
 If this card is ♥, then a ∨ b = 0.
 If this card is ♣, then a ∨ b = 1.
protocols for computing OR and XOR, which are realized with three and two
cards, respectively.
To construct card-based OR protocols, we should recall De Morgan’s law:
a ∨ b = ¬(¬a ∧ ¬b). The card-based OR protocol can be obtained from this
identity by negating Alice’s input, Bob’s input, and the output. Specifically,
when Alice inputs a = 0, she should use ♥ (otherwise ♣), and when Bob
inputs b = 0, he should place ♣ to the right of the card he received. Finally,
Table 3.3: Three-card OR Protocol
a b Step 2) Output
0 0 ♥Alice ♣Bob 0 (♥Alice)
0 1 ♣Bob ♥Alice 1 (♣Bob)
1 0 ♣Alice ♥Bob 1 (♣Alice)
1 1 ♣Bob ♣Alice 1 (♣Bob)
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Protocol 5 Two-card XOR Protocol
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}.
Initial Setting: Alice has ♣♥. Bob has no card.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♣♥ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♥♣ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, do nothing.
 If b = 1, swaps the received cards.
3) Open the two cards in public area.
 If these cards are ♣♥, then a⊕ b = 0.
 If these cards are ♥♣, then a⊕ b = 1.
the output should be negated. Then, we have Protocol 4, where the different
parts from Protocol 3 are underlined.
The relation among the inputs, the card order at the end of step 2), and
the output is shown in Table 3.3. Security proof is not necessary since this
protocol is essentially the same as Protocol 3.
3.3.2 Two-card XOR Protocol
The proposed two-card XOR protocol is shown in Protocol 5. In this protocol,
PPs are used in steps 1) and 2). The relationships among the inputs, the
pair of cards at the end of step 2), and the output is shown in Table 3.4.
Security of Two-card XOR Protocol: For Alice and Bob, there is no infor-
mation to be kept secret because, if the value of XOR and one of the two
inputs are given, the other input is uniquely determined. Furthermore, no
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Table 3.4: Two-card XOR Protocol
a b Step 2) Output
0 0 ♣ ♥ 0 (♣♥)
0 1 ♣ ♥ 1 (♥♣)
1 0 ♥ ♣ 1 (♥♣)
1 1 ♥ ♣ 0 (♣♥)
information except for the output is known to the players other than Alice
and Bob.
It is clear that no information is obtained by the players other than Alice
and Bob (if such players exist) because the only information they can get is
the output. □
3.4 Results and Discussion
In traditional card-based cryptography, it is necessary to use at least 2n cards
to realize an n-bit input protocol. This lower bound is due to the constraint
that input values must be represented by cards. However, PP removes this
restriction and enables us to construct a protocol with less than the lower
bound. In Chapter 3, we showed the following 2-bit input protocols could be
constructed with less than four cards.
 Section 3.2: three-card AND protocol proposed by Marcedone et al. [29]
 Section 3.3.1: three-card OR protocol
 Section 3.3.2: two-card XOR protocol
In this chapter, we focus on logic gates, which are the mainstream in
previous works. We succeeded in reducing the number of cards in these basic
protocols. The remaining chapter shows that more advanced protocols, such
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Chapter 3 showed that 2-bit input logic gates could be securely computed
with less than four cards. This result offers that PP is useful for reducing
the number of cards, using the basic protocols as an example. On the other
hand, the number of PPs and communications is not reduced since the logic
gates are basic functions, and thus there is no room for the reduction. In
this chapter, we propose a protocol for more advanced functions such as the
threshold function, which is efficient not only for the number of cards but
also for the number of PPs and communications.
Our Idea: The interesting points of card-based AND and OR protocols,
described in Chapter 3, are not only that we can substantially reduce the
number of cards, but we can also simultaneously realize AND and OR op-
erations. This simultaneous realization enables us to implement the 3-input
majority voting protocol with only four cards.
Our main idea for 3-input majority voting is to utilize the simultaneous
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realization of AND and OR operations. Observing the relations for a, b ∈
{0, 1},
a ∧ b = 1 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 2
a ∨ b = 1 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 1
it seems that a ∧ b and a ∨ b can be interpreted as the interim result of
the majority voting, respectively. Here, we consider the strategy that a ∧ b
and a ∨ b is passed to the third player, who holds c ∈ {0, 1}, for computing
the result of three-inputs majority voting. Then, we can understand that it
is different whether the desired value for the third player is a ∧ b or a ∨ b
depending on c from the following trivial relations,
if c = 0 then, a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 2,
if c = 1 then, a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 1.
Therefore, the third party should choose one of them depending on her input
c to obtain the result of the majority voting. Then, we note that the third
player needs not to use any card since she plays only the role of selecting a∧b
or a ∨ b, which are created by the other two players. In other words, we can
obtain a protocol for three-input majority voting without adding any cards
from simultaneous AND and OR protocol, i.e., we can construct it using only
four cards.
Our protocol for 3-input majority voting can be extended for more vot-
ers. Utilizing this fact, we construct a threshold function protocol by the
reduction to the majority votings. More formally, we utilize the following
property:
Let Πt,n be a protocol for threshold function where t is a threshold value
and n is the number of participants. Then Πt,n = Πt,n−1 holds if one of the
input values is fixed to 1.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Our Results in Chap. 4
Protocol References # of PPs # of comm. # of Cards
Majority Voting Nishida et al. [45] 5 3 8
with 3 inputs This work [Sect. 4.2] 3 2 4
Threshold Nishida et al. [44] 4n2 2n2 2n+ 2
Function This work [Sect. 4.3] n n− 1 n+ 1
This reduction is realized by setting up dummy participants whose in-
puts are fixed to 1. As a result, we obtain threshold function protocol with
n + 1 cards, which is fewer than the lower bound of traditional card-based
cryptography.
Organization: In Section 4.2, we first show how to obtain AND and OR
results simultaneously with four cards. We propose 3-input majority voting
protocol based on this protocol without additional cards. Also, we show that
this protocol can be extended to a protocol for the threshold function in
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 is the summary of this chapter.
4.2 Three-input Majority Voting Protocol with
Four Cards
Based on the observations on the three-card AND/OR protocols, we propose
a three-input majority voting protocol that uses only four cards. Consider
the scenario such that Alice, Bob, and Carol have their binary values a, b,
and c, respectively. They want to know the result of majority voting without
revealing their individual inputs.
Two types of realizations of such a majority voting protocol can be con-
sidered. One realization is computing the summation s := a+ b+ c and then
output s, which tells us which is the majority [32]. The other realization
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is to output 0 if the majority is 0, otherwise output 1 [58]. In this study,
we focus on the latter since it is more secure and theoretically interesting.
Specifically, we want to compute the following function maj(a, b, c) ∈ {0, 1}
securely:
maj3(a, b, c) =
{
0, if a+ b+ c ≤ 1
1, if a+ b+ c ≥ 2.
(4.1)
4.2.1 Idea behind Our Three-input Majority Voting
Protocol
Assume that Alice, Bob, and Carol vote a, b, and c, respectively, in this
order. We focus on the Carol’s vote c ∈ {0, 1}.
In the case of c = 0, the following relationship holds.
a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a ∧ b = 1 (4.2)
This relationship implies that a∧ b is the result of the majority voting when
c = 0.
Meanwhile, in the case of c = 1, we have the following relationship:
a+ b+ c ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ a+ b ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ a ∨ b = 1 (4.3)
Hence, a ∨ b is the result of the majority voting when c = 1.
Summarizing, we have
maj3(a, b, c) =
{
a ∧ b, if c = 0
a ∨ b, if c = 1,
(4.4)
which can be calculated securely if we can merge the AND and OR protocols
in Protocols 3 and 4, respectively. In fact, such unification is possible by
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Protocol 6 Modified Three-card OR Protocol
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}.
Setup: Alice has ♣♥ and Bob has ♥.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♣ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♥ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, places face-down ♥ to the left side of the receiced card.
 If b = 1, places face-down ♥ to the right side of the receiced card.
3) Open the right card in public area.
 If this card is ♣, then a ∨ b = 0.
 If this card is ♥, then a ∨ b = 1.
using four cards, which will be explained in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Unifying AND and OR Operations
The unrevealed card in step 3) is not utilized in this step for the three-card
AND and OR protocols in Protocols 3 and 4. Our main idea to simultane-
ously obtain a ∧ b and a ∨ b is that the wasted card is also effectively used
for representing output value.
Table 4.2: Modified Three-card OR Protocol
a b Step 2) Output
0 0 ♥Bob ♣Alice 0 (♣Alice)
0 1 ♣Alice ♥Bob 1 (♥Bob)
1 0 ♥Bob ♥Alice 1 (♥Alice)
1 1 ♥Alice ♥Bob 1 (♥Bob)
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These protocols are essentially the same based on De Morgan’s law.
Hence, they are symmetric form, and so, the unrevealed card is on the same
side, i.e., the right side. We first modify our three-card OR protocol to resolve
this match since it will hinder the simultaneous realization of them.
Modification of Three-card OR Protocol.
To obtain the unified protocol, we should reverse the left and right of the
card Bob chose for output in step 3) of Protocol 4. Then, we note that the
format of output values for Protocols 3 and 4 must be the same, i.e., we
should also resolve the problem which the correspondence between the suit
and output value is reversed in this protocol as seen in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
We exchange ♣ and ♥ in Protocol 4 based on the above discussion. More-
over, we swap the left and right side Bob selected in step 2) of Protocol 4 in
order to make a∨ b place on the right side, i.e., the opposite side of Protocol
3. Then, we obtain Protocol 6 from Protocol 4. The relationships among the
input and the output are shown in Table 4.2.
Four-card AND/OR Protocol.
Observe that the right card and the left card are discarded at the end of the
protocol in both Protocols 3 and 6, respectively. We also observe that Bob
has ♣ and ♥ at step 1) in both Protocols 3 and 6, respectively. From these
observations, we can merge Protocols 3 and 6 by letting Bob have both of
them, i.e., ♣ and ♥, in the initial setup. Then, we can implement the results
of AND and OR simultaneously with four cards, as shown in Protocol 7.
We show in the next section that this four-card AND/OR protocol is
useful in calculating the three-inputs majority voting with only four cards.
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Protocol 7 Four-card AND/OR protocol
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}.
Setup: Each of Alice and Bob has ♣♥.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♣ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♥ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, places face-down ♣ on the left side of the received card.
 If b = 1, places face-down ♥ on the right side of the received card.
3) Let 0 7→ ♣ and 1 7→ ♥. Then, the left card expresses a ∧ b and the right
card expresses a ∨ b.
4.2.3 Three-input Majority Voting Protocol with Four
Cards
Based on the four-card AND/OR protocol, it is easy to compute the majority
voting protocol. First, Alice and Bob compute a∧b and a∨b simultaneously,
where the result is concealed. Then, Carol chooses a ∧ b or a ∨ b depending
on c = 0 or c = 1, respectively, behind her back. The detailed algorithm is
shown in Protocol 8. Formally, step 4) is performed with the same PP as
(3.1) in Chapter 3. Then, the left card is the picked out card.
Table 4.3 shows the pair of cards at the end of step 2) and the output.
Note that the third player, Carol, has no card for her input since her role is
to choose a ∧ b or a ∨ b by PP. Thus, our protocol for the three-inputs ma-
jority voting does not require any additional card from four-card AND/OR
protocol.
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Protocol 8 Three-input Majority Voting Protocol
Inputs: Alice has a ∈ {0, 1}, Bob has b ∈ {0, 1}, and Carol has c ∈ {0, 1}.
Setup: Alice and Bob each have a pair ♣♥. Carol has no card.
1) Alice performs the following operation.
 If a = 0, sends face-down ♣ to Bob.
 If a = 1, sends face-down ♥ to Bob.
2) Bob performs the following operation with PP.
 If b = 0, places face-down ♣ on the left side of the received card.
 If b = 1, places face-down ♥ on the right side of the received card.
3) Bob sends the two cards to Carol.
4) Carol performs the following operation with PP.
 If c = 0, picks out the left card of the received card.
 If c = 1, picks out the right card of the received card.
5) Open the picked out card in public area.
 If this card is ♣, then the output value is 0.
 If this card is ♥, then the output value is 1.
4.3 Card-based Threshold Function Protocol
In this section, we show a new protocol for the threshold function by general-
izing Protocol 8. Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be Boolean inputs of n players P1, . . . , Pn
respectively. Then, our (t, n)-threshold function protocol aims to compute
the following function without revealing input values.




i=1 xi < t
1, otherwise
(4.5)
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Table 4.3: Three-input Majority Voting
a b c Step 2) Output
0 0 0 ♣Bob ♣Alice 0 (♣Bob)
0 1 0 ♣Alice ♥Bob 0 (♣Alice)
1 0 0 ♣Bob ♥Alice 0 (♣Bob)
1 1 0 ♥Alice ♥Bob 1 (♥Alice)
0 0 1 ♣Bob ♣Alice 0 (♣Alice)
0 1 1 ♣Alice ♥Bob 1 (♥Bob)
1 0 1 ♣Bob ♥Alice 1 (♥Alice)
1 1 1 ♥Alice ♥Bob 1 (♥Bob)
4.3.1 Extending to n-input Majority Voting Protocol
We first show that our three-input majority voting protocol, shown in Section
4.2.3, can be extended to n-input majority voting protocol. Here, we define
the function for n-input majority voting as follows. *1




i=1 xi < n/2
1, otherwise
(4.6)
The first step for generalizing the number of inputs is to focus on the three
players, Alice, Bob, and Carol, in our three-input majority voting protocol.
We will discuss the roles of the first half players (Alice, Bob) who use cards
for input and the second half (Carol) who does not use cards for input. Here,
Table 4.4 summarizes the relationship between input and output focus on the
input values’ sum.
In Section 4.2, Carol’s operation was explained as an operation of “se-
lecting an output card,” but in this section, it is interpreted as the operation
of “removing unnecessary cards” for generalization. In other words, we in-
terpret Carol’s role as removing the right card if c = 0 and removing the left
*1Note that 1 is output if n is even and the number of inputs of 0 and 1 are the same.
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Table 4.4: Mechanism of Three-input Majority Voting Protocol
Received Cards Output Output
a+ b of Carol (c = 0) (c = 1)
0 ♣♣ ♣ ♣
1 ♣♥ ♣ ♥
2 ♥♥ ♥ ♥
Table 4.5: Mechanism of n-input Majority Voting Protocol (Case of n = 5)
Received Cards Output Output Output
x1 + x2 + x3 of P4 (x4 + x5 = 0) (x4 + x5 = 1) (x4 + x5 = 2)
0 ♣♣♣ ♣ ♣ ♣
1 ♣♣♥ ♣ ♣ ♥
2 ♣♥♥ ♣ ♥ ♥
3 ♥♥♥ ♥ ♥ ♥
card if c = 1. In the framework of n-input majority voting, the discussion is
based on the policy that the first half players Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ dn/2e) is “the play-
ers who have the input cards and adds one card” and the second half players
Pj (dn/2e < j ≤ n) is “the players who have no input card and removes one
card.” As a result, the last remaining card is the output.
Case Where n Is An Odd Number
We suppose that the first half of players Pi (i = 1, . . . , n) perform the same
operations as Alice and Bob in our three-input majority voting protocol.
Namely, for 1 ≤ i ≤ dn/2e, suppose that Pi performs the following operations
with PP sequentially.
 If xi = 0, then Pi places face-down ♣ on the leftmost of the received
cards, and sends the cards after processing to Pi+1.
 If xi = 1, then Pi places face-down ♥ on the rightmost of the received
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cards, and sends the cards after processing to Pi+1.
However, P1 only sends ♣ or ♥ to P2, like Alice, since there is no card sent
from the previous player.
We do not interpret Carol’s operation as “selecting an output card” but
“removing an unnecessary card,” and suppose the second half players Pi (i =
1, . . . , n) perform the same operation as her. Namely, for Pj (dn/2e < j ≤ n),
suppose that Pj performs the following operations with PP sequentially.
 If xj = 0, then Pj removes the rightmost card of the received cards,
and sends the cards to Pj+1.
 If xj = 1, then Pj removes the leftmost card of the received cards, and
sends the cards to Pj+1.
However, Pn only removes the rightmost or leftmost card and outputs the
remaining card.
For instance, in the case where n = 5, the input/output relationship
that the above procedures are applied is as shown in Table 4.5. This is an
extension of Table 4.4, and it can be seen that the correct output is obtained.
On the other hand, we can easily understand that the above procedures
cannot obtain correct output if n is an even number because the number
of “players who add one card” and “players who remove one card” is the
same, and no output card remains. The case where n is an even number is
explained in the next section. Here, we confirm that the above procedures
satisfy correctness and security when n is an odd number.
Correctness: Let s be the number of players whose input value is 0 among
the first half players Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ (n + 1)/2). Then, the card order received
by P(n+1)/2+1 is s cards are ♣ and (n + 1)/2 − s cards are ♥ from the left.
Also, let t be the number of players whose input value is 0 among the second
half players Pj ((n+ 1)/2 < j ≤ n).
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• If s+ t < (n+ 1)/2
Then, the number of players t to remove the rightmost card is less than
(n + 1)/2 − s. Therefore, the final remaining card is ♥ representing






s cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
♣ · · · ♣ ♥ · · · ♥ ♥ ♥ · · · ♥
• If s+ t ≥ (n+ 1)/2
Then, the number of players t to remove the rightmost card is (n +
1)/2 −s or more. Therefore, the final remaining card is ♣ representing






s cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
♣ · · · ♣ ♣ ♣ · · · ♣ ♥ · · · ♥
□
Security: It is trivial that no information beyond the output is leaked since
only the ourput card is opened and players’ operations are hidden by the
assumption of PP. □
Case Where n Is An Even Number
In order to realize n-input majority voting protocol where n is an even num-
ber, we utilize the following equivalence relation.
majn(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 ⇐⇒ majn+1(1, x1, . . . , xn) = 1 (4.7)
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Namely, in the case where n is an even number, we realize n-input majority
voting protocol by reducing n+1-input majority voting protocol. The specific
procedure is the following:
Suppose the first player P ′1 is a dummy player whose input is fixed at 1
in the n + 1-input majority voting protocol. The result of this protocol is
the same as the result of n-input majority voting by n players, excluding P ′1,
from the above equivalence relation. Thus, we can realize n-input majority
voting protocol by executing n + 1-input majority voting protocol from the
state where P ′1 inputs 1.
Note that the dummy player P ′1 needs only ♥ since she does not input 0.
The reason for making the P ′1, who is the role of adding a card, a dummy
is this reduction of the number of cards. It is possible to make a player in
the role of removing a card, e.g., P ′n, as a dummy. However, in this case, one
more card is required than when P ′1 is used as a dummy.
Graphical Interpretation: Figure 4.1 shows that the mechanism of how to im-
plement our majority voting protocol with even number inputs, using n = 4
as an example. The vertical axis means the threshold value and the horizon-
tal one means the number of inputs. This figure shows the flow that reduces
to the next majority voting (or threshold) function each time an input value
is determined. The protocol is executed as a five-input majority voting, but
the result is the same as a four-input majority voting since the input value
of one player is fixed at 1 in advance.
4.3.2 Secure Computation for (t, n)-threshold Function
with n+ 1 Cards
The idea to construct the threshold function protocol is essentially the same
as the n-input majority voting protocol when n is even. We utilize the
following equivalence relation. Here, we can assume t < n/2 without loss of
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Figure 4.1: Graphical Interpretation of Four-input Majority Voting Protocol
Figure 4.2: Graphical Interpretation of Threshold Function Protocol
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generality since inputs 0 and 1 can be reversed if t ≥ n/2. Also, even if 0
and 1 are not reversed, it is possible to realize the reduction by fixing the
dummy input value to 0.
f(t,n)(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 ⇐⇒ f(t+1,n+1)(1, x1, . . . , xn) = 1 (4.8)
In other words, we realize the threshold function protocol by selecting an
integer d such that f(t+d,n+d) is the odd number input majority function and
reducing to (n+ d)-input majority voting protocol.
Let f(t,n) be the threshold function to be computed. Then, we reduce this
function to f(n−t+1,2n−2t+1) = maj2n−2t+1. Thus, we can obtain the result of
f(t,n) by executing the protocol for maj2n−2t+1 with n− 2t+1 dummy players
whose input values are 1. The specific procedure is shown in Protocol 9.
♥ × n − 2t + 1 possessed by P1 in setup are the inputs of dummy players.
This protocol is constructed with ♣× t and ♥× n− t+ 1.
Graphical Interpretation: Figure 4.2 shows that the mechanism of how to
implement our threshold function protocol. This figure shows the flow that
reduces to the next threshold function each time an input value is determined.
The protocol is executed as a (n− t+1, 2n− 2t+1)-threshold function, i.e.,
2n−2t+1-input majority voting, but the result is the same as (t, n)-threshold
function since the input values of n−2t+1 players are fixed at 1 in advance.
4.4 Results and Discussion
In the previous chapter, we succeeded in reducing the number of cards in the
basic protocols. Thus, this chapter showed that PP also works effectively in
constructing protocols for more advanced functions.
Chapter 4 proposed the following three protocols.
 Section 4.2: Simultaneous AND/OR protocol with four cards
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 Section 4.2: 3-input majority voting protocol with four cards
 Section 4.3: (t, n)-threshold function protocol with n− 1 cards
We first showed that the AND and OR protocols described in Chapter 3 could
be improved to four-card AND/OR protocol, which can be simultaneously
obtained AND and OR result in order to construct a protocol for 3-input
majority based on this protocol. Our protocol for 3-input majority voting
can be realized based on the AND/OR protocol without additional cards.
As a result, we realize the protocol for majority voting with only four cards.
This protocol can be extended to protocols for more voters. Utilizing this
fact, we construct a threshold function protocol with n − 1 cards, which is
fewer than the lower bound of traditional card-based cryptography. This
protocol is more efficient in terms of not only the number of cards but also
the number of PPs and communications than the existing protocol.
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Protocol 9 (t, n)-threshold Function Protocol
Inputs: Let x1, . . . xn ∈ {0, 1} be input values of each player.
Setup: P1, . . . , Pt each have a pair ♣♥. In addition, P1 has ♥× n− 2t+ 1.
1) For i = 1, . . . , t, repeat the following operation with PP to the received
cards.
 If xi = 0, Pi places face-down ♣ on the leftmost, and sends the cards
after processing to Pi+1.
 If xi = 1, Pi places face-down ♥ on the rightmost, and sends the
cards after processing to Pi+1.
Suppose that P1 only performs the operation to place a card.
2) For j = t+1, . . . , n, repeat the following operation with PP to the received
cards.
 If xj = 0, then Pj removes the rightmost card, and sends the cards
after processing to Pj+1.
 If xj = 1, then Pj removes the leftmost card, and sends the cards
after processing to Pj+1.
Suppose that Pn only performs the removal operation.
3) Open the remaining one card in public area.
 If this card is ♣, then the output value is 0.
 If this card is ♥, then the output value is 1.
Chapter 5
How to Solve Millionaires’
Problem
5.1 Introduction
In traditioanal card-based-cryptography adopts the private model that as-
sumes all operations are performed in public. Shuffle is the critical opera-
tion to achieve confidentiality even in this condition. However, card-based
cryptography principle becomes different from algebraic MPC shuffle is too
card-oriented operation.
The introduction of PP makes card-based cryptography closer to alge-
braic MPC. As a result, it is easier to mutually utilize knowledge between
them. We demonstrate that a new card-based protocol can be obtained by
converting Yao’s (algebraic) millionaires’ protocol into a card-based protocol
(Millionaires’ protocol I). This conversion can be easily derived if we under-
stand how his protocol works. Thus, we explain the outline of Yao’s protocol
before describing the proposed protocol.
It is the mainstream to propose logic gate protocols in traditional card-
based cryptography since it is known that every Boolean function can be
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computed with a combination of logic gates. Millionaires’ protocol can also be
constructed with a combination of logic gates. We compare our protocols and
the protocol based on Algorithm 10. This algorithm involves 2m−1 AND and
2m−2 OR times. When executing these logic gates, the COPY operation [38]
is necessary for copy ¬ai and bi in each comparison of bits. Summarizing,
6dlog de − 5 shuffles are necessary for total to implement Protocol 10. We
summarize our result in Table 5.1.
Although our protocol based on Yao’s solution succeeds in improving the
number of PPs and communications, the number of cards exponentially in-
creases from the existing protocol. Thus, we propose another millionaires’
protocol that also improves the number of cards (Millionaires’ protocol II).
We adopt the bitwise comparison for reducing the number of cards. Million-
aires’ protocol II compares bit by bit from the less significant bit, and the
compared results are recorded on cards, called storage. The results recorded
in the storage need to be kept secret from both Alice and Bob. Hence, we
show how to manipulate the storage privately by using PPs. It is very inter-
esting to note that the idea of Millionaires’ protocol II is the same as that of
the well-known logic puzzle “The fork in the road.” This observation will be
introduced when explaining the idea of Millionaires’ protocol II in Section
5.3.1.
Unfortunately, Millionares’ protocol II still requires the same number
of cards as the previous work, whereas the other measures are evidently
improved. Hence, we discuss how to reduce the number of cards in Section
5.3.3. The main idea of this improvement is that inputs are not represented as
the sequence of cards but are memorized in players’ mind. This improvement
enables Millionaires’ protocol II to realize with only six cards.
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2,
the card-based cryptography for the millionaires’ problem based on Yao’s
protocol is presented. Section 5.3 is devoted to the proposal of a new card-
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Protocol 10 Comparing Protocol Constructed by Logic Gates
Input: a = (am · · · a2 a1)2, b = (bm · · · b2 b1)2
f1 = ā1 ∧ b1
for i = 2 to m do
fi = āi ∧ bi ∨ (āi ∨ bi) ∧ fi−1 ;
end for
Output: fm
if fn = 0 then a ≥ b
if fn = 1 then a < b
Table 5.1: Summary of Our Results in Chap. 5
Protocols # of Comm. # of PP # of cards
logic gates (Algo. 10) 6m− 5 12m− 10 4m+ 2
Millionaires’ protocol I (Yao) 1 2 2 · 2m
Millionaires’ protocol II (storage) 2m 2m+ 1 4m+ 2
Improvement of millionaires’ protocol II 2m 2m+ 1 6
based cryptographic protocol with storage. We also show an improvement in
the proposed protocol that reduces the number of cards. We summarize this
chapter in Section 5.4.
5.2 Millionaires’ Protocol I: Card-Based Cryp-
tographic for Millionaires’ Problem Based
on Yao’s Solution
5.2.1 Our Idea Behind the Millionaires’ Protocol I
We propose a card-based cryptography that resolves the millionaires’ problem
by cards based on Yao’s original solution utilizing PPs. Before providing our
protocol, we explain Yao’s public key based solution [61] as follows:
Yao’s Solution to the Millionaires’ Problem. For a fixed integer m ∈ N,
assume that Alice and Bob have wealth represented by positive integers a
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and b, respectively, where a, b ∈ [d]. Let X := [2N − 1] be a set of N -bit
integers where, 2N/2 > 2d is necessary to hold |zu − zv| ≥ 2 in step 〈4〉 for
all distinct u, v ∈ [d]. (EncA,DecA) is a public-key encryption of Alice. That
is, EncA : X → X is an encryption under Alice’s public-key, and DecA is a
decryption under Alice’s private-key.
〈1〉 Bob selects a random N -bit integer x ∈ X , and computes c := EncA(x)
privately.
〈2〉 Bob sends the number c− b+ 1 in the mod 2N sense to Alice.
〈3〉 For i = 1, 2, . . . , d, Alice computes privately the values of yi = DecA(c−
b+ i); each value c− b+ i is in the mod 2N sense.
〈4〉 Alice generates a random prime p ∈ [2N/2 − 1], and computes the
values zi := yi mod p, for i = 1, 2, . . . , d. If |zu − zv| ≥ 2 for all distinct
u, v ∈ [d], then go to the next step; otherwise generate another random
prime p and repeat the process until all zu differ by at least 2.
〈5〉 Alice makes z′ = (z1, z2, . . . , za, za+1+1, za+2+1, . . . , zd+1); each value
is in the mod p sense.
〈6〉 Alice sends p and the vector z′ to Bob.
〈7〉 Bob looks at the b-th number in z′. If it is equal to x mod p, then
a ≥ b, otherwise a < b.
〈8〉 Bob sends the result to Alice.
Our Idea Behind Millionaires’ Protocol I. We first point out that the key
steps of Yao’s protocol are 〈5〉–〈7〉, where Alice privately adds 1 to each of
za+1, za+2, . . . , zd in the m-dimensional vector, and sends the vector to Bob.
He privately checks the b-th value in the vector, and outputs the result. This
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private operation can be implemented by PP in card-based cryptography,
which corresponds to the step 〈3〉 in the following millioniares’ protocol I.
Note that, in Yao’s solution, 〈1〉–〈4〉 are necessary for realizing the key
steps 〈5〉–〈7〉 securely, since they prevent the vector z′ in 〈5〉 from leaking
Alice’s wealth a to Bob. However, in a card-based cryptography, these steps
can be replaced with single step since face down plays the role of encryption.
Furthermore, the communication in 〈8〉 can be removed in the card-based
protocol since face-up cards on the tabletop can immediately be recognized
by both Alice and Bob.
5.2.2 Millionaires’ Protocol I
Based on the ideas discussed in the previous section, we propose a card-based
protocol for the millionaires’ problem based on Yao’s solution (see Protocol
11). We refer to this protocol Millionaires’ protocol I. The definitions of a, b
and m are the same as the previous section. Let χge(·, ·) be a function such
that
χge(u, v) :=
1 if u ≥ v0 otherwise, (5.1)
for positive integers u, v ∈ [d].
Note that steps 1) and 2) in Millionaires’ protocol I correspond to steps
〈1〉–〈5〉, and the steps 3) and 4) correspond to steps 〈6〉 and 〈7〉, respectively,
which show that the step 2) considerably simplifies Yao’s protocol. We omit
the proof of correctness of the proposed protocol since it is almost obvious
from Yao’s protocol.
Note that (EncA,DecA) in Yao’s millionaires’ protocol must be public-key
encryption since a is obtained by Bob in step 〈6〉 if (EncA,DecA) is a private
key encryption. On the other hand, in Millionaires’ protocol I, such leakage
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Protocol 11 Millionaires’ Protocol I: Card-based Yao’s Solution
1) Alice prepares m pairs of ♣♥ and turn them all face down. This
preparation is represented in a vector form as (x⃗1, x⃗2, . . . , x⃗d) where
x⃗1 = x⃗2 = · · · = x⃗d = (♣,♥).
2) For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, repeat the operation in which Alice swaps x⃗i if i >
a; otherwise does not. Each swap operation must be executed privately,
and it is described as the following PP with respect to Rbc2 := {π0, π1}





ge(i− 1, a)), i = 1, 2, . . . , d, (5.2)
where χge(·, ·) is defined in (5.1), i.e., χge(i − 1, a) = 1 iff i > a.
As a result, Alice privately generates the sequence of cards x⃗′ :=
(x⃗′1, x⃗
′









3) Alice sends x⃗′ to Bob.
4) Bob privately moves x⃗′b to the first element of x⃗





(x⃗′, b− 1) = πb−1(x⃗′) (5.3)
where Rmf2d := {πi}d−1i=0 such that πi : (1, 2, . . . , d) 7→ (i+1, 1, 2, . . . , i, i+
2, . . . , d).
5) Bob reveals the left most commitment of PP
[2m]
Rmf2d
(x⃗′, b − 1), i.e., x⃗′b. If
the value represented by x⃗′b is 0, then a ≥ b, otherwise a < b.
The remaining cards are completely randomized by Alice or Bob in public in
order to discard the information of x⃗′ except for x⃗′b. We call this operation
“the remaining cards are discarded,” hereafter.
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of a to Bob is prevented by requiring that all cards except x⃗′b are completely
randomized in public by Alice or Bob at the end of the protocol.
Efficiency of Millionaires’ protocol I. In the proposed protocol, 2d cards are
used. The number of PPs and communications is constant, i.e., it does not
depend on the input length. We use two PPs in steps 2) and 4), and one
communication in step 3), and this outperforms the protocol based on logic
gates (see Algo. 10). We note that the steps 4) and 5) are necessary so that
Bob turns x⃗′b face up publicly without making b public.
*1
Theorem 1 Millionaires’ protocol I is perfectly secure; it satisfies (2.7) in
Definition 1.
Proof: Consider the randomness used by Alice and Bob denoted by RA and
RB, respectively. In this protocol, no randomness is used by Alice since
she only swaps the cards by using a and m. Hence, it is not necessary for
the simulator SA to simulate RA. We also find that Bob does not use his
randomness, and RB also need not be simulated by SB.
Regarding the public value Λ, observe that it is only the cards x⃗′b revealed
in step 5), and the binary value represented by x⃗′b is equal to the truth value
of a ≥ b. Hence, Λ is uniquely determined from the output, and it can
obviously be simulated, which completes the proof. □
Remark. Thanks to the special operations of card-based cryptography, e.g.,
face up, face down, and swap, etc., Millionaires’ protocol I is not only a di-
rect transformation of Yao’s protocol, but also is superior to the original one
from several aspects. For instance, Millionaires’ protocol I does not use any
randomness, whereas randomness is necessary for generating public/private
keys in the original solution by Yao. Furthermore, it is worth observing that
both Alice and Bob can know the output result simultaneously in Million-
*1Private selection of x⃗′b and making it public are formally realized in this manner.
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aires’ protocol I, whereas Bob is required to announce his result to Alice in
Yao’s original protocol (see step 〈8〉).
5.3 Millionaires’ Protocol II: Card-Based Cryp-
tographic Protocol for Millionaires’ Prob-
lem with Storage
5.3.1 Ideas Behind Millionaires’ Protocol II
In order to reduce the number of cards to below 2d, it is natural to represent
the wealth of Alice and Bob as binary number with dlog de bits (i.e., 2dlog de
cards). This approach enables us to consider the strategy by comparing the
Alice’s and Bob’s wealth bit-by-bit starting from their least significant bits.
Let (am, . . . , a1) and (bm, . . . , b1) be the binary representation of the pos-
itive integers a and b, respectively, where m := dlog de and ai, bi ∈ {0, 1}, i =
1, 2, . . . ,m. For each i ∈ [m], assume that ai and bi are represented by pairs
of cards αi,lαi,r and βi,lβi,r, respectively, where αi,lαi,r, βi,lβi,r ∈ {♣♥,♥♣}.
For instance, ai = 1 is represented by cards as αi,lαi,r = ♥♣.
Note that, however, such a two-card representation of binary number is
redundant in a bit-by-bit comparison since we can represent 0 and 1 by ♣
and ♥, respectively.*2 In this one-card representation, αi,l and βi,l suffice to
represent ai and bi, respectively. Further, their negations, ¬ai and ¬bi, are
also represented by αi,r and βi,r, respectively. In the following, we consider a
scenario in which Alice prepares (am, . . . , a1) by using a two-card representa-
tion, but here, Alice and Bob use a one-card representation for comparison.
We compare the bits of Alice and Bob by preparing a device (equipped
*2However, we note that a one-card representation cannot express arbitrary binary num-
bers. Hence, 4dlog de (i.e., 2dlog de cards for Alice and Bob) cards are at least necessary
when comparing arbitrary two binary numbers less than m.
72 CHAPTER 5. HOW TO SOLVE MILLIONAIRES’ PROBLEM
by a card as well) called comparison storage, denoted by cs ∈ {♣,♥}, that
records the bit-by-bit comparison results. Our idea is roughly described as
follows: We assume that Bob compares βi,l (i.e., bi) with Alice’s card αi,l
(i.e., ai) from i = 1 to n, and he overwrites cs with βi,l (i.e., bi) if βi,l 6= αi,l
(i.e., bi 6= ai) while cs remains untouched if this is not the case (i.e., bi = ai).
Recalling that Bob overwrites the comparison storage with his bit, Bob is
shown to be richer if the comparison storage is ♥ (i.e., 1) at the end of the
protocol. Similarly, Alice is shown to be richer if the comparison storage is
♣ (i.e., 0) at the end of the protocol. As is easily understood, however, this
rough idea has the following a problem:
P1) If Bob were to directly compare his bits with those of Alice, such a
comparison strategy would easily leaks Alice’s bits to Bob.
This problem can be avoided by considering the following modified ran-
domized strategy: Since Alice prepares (am, . . . , a1) by two-card representa-
tions, she sends Bob αi,l (i.e., ai) or αi,r (i.e., ¬ai) with probability 1/2. Such
a randomization is effective for concealing the value of Alice’s bit from Bob,
but we encounter another problem:
P2) Since Alice sends αi,w to Bob w ∈ {l, r} with a probability of 1/2, he
cannot tell from αi,w whether ai 6= bi or not.
Problem P2) is resolved by introducing another storage called dummy
storage, denoted by ds ∈ {♣,♥}, and communicating the pair of cs and ds
between Alice and Bob.
Hereafter, we refer to the pair consisting of cs and ds as storage. Bob
overwrites cs and ds corresponding to the result of ai 6= bi and ai = bi.
However, just adding a new storage is insufficient to resolve the problem that
Bob cannot determine whether ai 6= bi or ai = bi, i.e., he cannot determine
which one of cs and ds should be overwritten.
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Problem P2) can be rephrased using binary numbers as follows: Let
a′i ∈ {0, 1} be a binary number that Bob receives, but he does not know
whether a′i = ai (in the case of w = l) or a
′
i = ¬ai (in the case of w = r).
Our main object is to find ai 6= bi or ai = bi even if either one of a′i = ai or
a′i = ¬ai is sent.*3
Basic idea for resolving P2) is that Bob uses the fact that what he knows
is either αi,w 6= βi,l (i.e., a′i 6= bi) or αi,w = βi,l (i.e., a′i = bi). Making use
of this fact, Alice and Bob treat cs and ds as an ordered pair of face-down
cards, and assume that either (cs, ds) or (ds, cs) is determined by Alice’s
private random choice w ∈ {l, r} as follows:
 If Alice selects w = l and sends Bob αi,l ∈ {♣,♥} (i.e., ai), then she
sends him (cs, ds) with αi,l.
 If Alice selects w = r and sends Bob αi,r ∈ {♣,♥} (i.e., ¬ai), then she
sends him (ds, cs) with αi,r.
Note that αi,w is not necessary to be face-down when she sends it since
no information on a leaks to Bob from αi,w. We can see that the order of
cs and ds is synchronized with w ∈ {l, r} (i.e., ai and ¬ai) in Alice. Owing
to this synchronization, Bob can correctly overwrite cs only when ai 6= bi by
implementing the following strategy, even if he does not know which one of cs
and ds should be overwritten. Let (σl, σr) be the storage Bob receives from
Alice. Then Bob’s behavior after receiving αi,w from Alice is shown below.
 If αi,w 6= βi,l (i.e., a′i 6= bi) holds, Bob overwrites the left element σl of
the storage (σl, σr) with βi,l (i.e., bi).
 If αi,w = βi,l (i.e., a
′
i = bi) holds, Bob overwrites the right element σr
of the storage (σl, σr) with βi,l (i.e., bi).
*3This problem is very similar to the well-known logical problem “The fork in the road.”
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Table 5.2: Synchronization Mechanism in Millionaires’ Protocol II
(cs, ds), w = l (ds, cs), w = r




i 6= bi Overwrite a′i (αi,r) a′i 6= bi Overwrite
0 (♣) 1 (♥) 0 (♣) True left = cs 1 (♥) False right = cs
1 (♥) 0 (♣) 1 (♥) True left = cs 0 (♣) False right = cs
0 (♣) 0 (♣) 0 (♣) False right = ds 1 (♥) True left = ds
1 (♥) 1 (♥) 1 (♥) False right = ds 0 (♣) True left = ds
Let (σ′l, σ
′





Alice. Then, by using w ∈ {l, r} that Alice generated, she privately rear-
ranges (σ′l, σ
′
r) so as to place cs and ds on the left and the right, respectively.
After repeating these procedures from i = 1 to m, Bob is shown to be richer
if cs = ♥ (i.e., 1) whereas the contrary is true if cs = ♣ (i.e., 0).
It is easy to see from Table 5.2 that our synchronization strategy for
storage works well. This is best clarified by discussing the proposed protocol
by using binary numbers rather than cards. For instance, consider the case
where Alice compares her bit ai = 1 with Bob’s bit bi = 0 (the second line
in Table 5.2). If Alice selects w = l, Bob receives a bit a′i = ai = 1 and
compares it with Bob’s bit bi = 0. Since a
′
i 6= bi, the left-hand side element
of the storage, i.e., cs, is overwritten by bi = 0. On the other hand, if Alice
selects w = r, Bob receives a bit a′i = ¬ai = 0 and compares it with his bit
bi = 0. Since a
′
i = bi = 0, the right-hand side element of the storage, i.e.,
cs, is overwritten by bi = 0. Anyway, cs is correctly overwritten by bi = 0
(< ai = 1) as expected.
Remark. It is interesting to note that the logic of the above synchronization
strategy is the same as that of the well-known logic puzzle “The fork in the
road,” [19, p.25] (see footnote *8). Note that the point of the “The fork
in the road” is that we need to obtain the correct answer (correct branch)
from “yes-no-questions,” regardless of whether the native bystander tells the
truth. The one of the well-known answers to this puzzle is that the logician
should ask “if I ask the right way goes to the village, then do you answer
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YES?.” This question consists of two propositions as follows:
Q1) The right way goes to the village.
Q2) The bystander answers YES.
Suppose that the right way goes to the village. If the native bystander is a
truth-teller, then obviously the logician receives YES. On the other hand, the
logician have the same answer (YES) even if the bystander is a liar because
of the following double negation:
L1) The liar wants to say NO to Q1) because Q1) is true.
L2) The liar has to say YES because Q2) is false (due to L1)).
Namely, telling lies twice for Q1) and Q2), the liar says YES if the right
way goes to the village; NO otherwise. Our synchronization strategy has the
same structure with this puzzle. In Millionaires’ protocol II, Alice chooses
whether she sends ai (i.e., truth) or ¬ai (i.e., lie), which corresponds to L1).
If she chooses the lie, then she reverses the order of storage cards cd and ds,
which has the same effect with L2). Due to this structure of double negation,
Bob can correctly record the comparison result regardless of Alice’s choice.
Therefore, we can verify the correctness of Millionaires’ protocol II.
5.3.2 Millionaires’ Protocol II
Based on the discussion in the previous section, we propose the card-based
cryptography which uses storage and synchronization between the random
selection w ∈ {l, r} and the order of cs and ds, for the Millionaires’ problem
(see Protocol 12). For the upper bound d ∈ N of the wealth of Alice and
Bob, let m := dlog de.
*4This card can be arbitrary since it is a dummy card.
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Protocol 12 Millionaires’ Protocol II
1) Alice prepares a face-down ♣ and a face-down ♥*4 as the comparison
storage cs and the dummy storage ds, respectively. We call the pair
consisting of cs and ds storage. She also prepares a sequence of 2n
cards (αm,lαm,r, . . . , α2,lα2,r, α1,lα1,r), which is a binary representation
of her wealth a ∈ [d]. Bob also prepares the sequence of 2n cards
(βm,lβm,r, . . . , β2,lβ2,r, β1,lβ1,r), which is the binary representation of his
wealth b ∈ [d].
2) For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, repeat the following operations (2-i)–(2-v):
(2-i) Alice privately chooses w ∈ {l, r} uniformly at random. Then,
execute the following PP with respect to Rbc2 which is defined in
(2.4) with v = 1:
(σl, σr) := PP
[2]
Rbc2
((cs, ds), χeq(w, r)) (5.4)
where χeq(w, r) = 1 if w = r, and χeq(w, r) = 0 otherwise.
(2-ii) Alice sends Bob (σl, σr) in addition to αi,w. Here, αi,w need not
be face down.
(2-iii) Bob compares βi,l with αi,w in his mind. If they are different, he
privately overwrites σl with βi,l, otherwise he privately overwrites
σr with βi,l. This operation can be described as the following PP
with respect to Row13 := {π0, π1} where π0 : (1, 2, 3) 7→ (1, 3, 2)
and π1 : (1, 2, 3) 7→ (3, 2, 1):
(σ′l, σ
′
r, η) := PP
[3]
Row13
((σl, σr, βi,l), χeq(βi,l, αi,w)) (5.5)
where χeq(·, ·) := 1−χeq(·, ·). The extra card η is discarded with-
out turning it face up.
(2-iv) Bob sends Alice (σ′l, σ
′
r).
(2-v) Alice rearranges the storage cards privately depending on the ran-








which is used for the new storage cards (cs, ds).
3) Alice turns cs face up to output. If the card is♣, then a ≥ b. Otherwise,
a < b. After completing the protocol, ds is discarded without revealing.
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Example of Millionaires’ protocol II. We show a simple example for under-
standing how the Millionaires’ protocol II works correctly. Consider the case
where we compare a = 0 of Alice and b = 2 of Bob, which are represented
by (α2,lα2,r, α1,lα1,r) := (♣♥,♣♥) and (β2,lβ2,r, β1,lβ1,r) := (♥♣,♣♥), re-
spectively, since (a2, a1) = (0, 0) and (b2, b1) = (1, 0). We also set (cs, ds) =
(♣,♥).
We first consider the case of i = 1. If Alice chooses w = l in step (2-i), (5.4)
becomes (σl, σr) = (cs, ds) = (♣,♥) since χeq(w, r) = χeq(l, r) = 0. Then,
she sends Bob (σl, σr) = (♣,♥) and α1,l = ♣ in step (2-ii). In step (2-iii),
Bob compares β1,l = ♣ with α1,l = ♣, which results in χeq(β1,l, α1,l) = 0.
Then, he outputs (σ′l, σ
′
r) = (σl, β1,l) = (♣,♣) by overwriting the right
element of (σl, σr) = (♣,♥) with β1,l = ♣ privately, since (5.5) becomes
(σ′l, σ
′
r, η) = (σl, β1,l, σr) due to χ
eq(β1,l, α1,l) = 0. Bob discards σr without
face up σr = ♥.
On the other hand, consider the case where Alice chooses w = r in step
(2-i); Then, (5.4) in step (2-i) becomes (σl, σr) = (ds, cs) = (♥,♣) since
χeq(w, r) = χeq(r, r) = 1. She sends Bob (σl, σr) = (♥,♣) and α1,r = ♥ in
step (2-ii). Bob compares β1,l = ♣ with α1,r = ♥, and outputs (σ′l, σ′r) =
(♣,♣) by overwriting the left element of (σl, σr) = (♥,♣) with β1,l = ♣
privately as a result of (5.5).
Summarizing the case of i = 1, regardless of the selection of w ∈ {l, r},
storage becomes (cs, ds) = (♣,♣), which means that the dummy storage is
overwritten by the Bob’s bit since a1 = b1. Then, Bob sends it to Alice in
step (2-iv). In step (2-v), Alice sets (cs, ds) := (♣,♣) due to (5.6) for the
storage sent from Bob.
Next, consider the case of i = 2: If Alice selects w = l in step (2-i), she
generates (σl, σr) = (cs, ds) = (♣,♣) from (5.4), and sends it with α2,l = ♣ to
Bob in step (2-ii). Then, Bob compares β2,l = ♥ with α2,l = ♣ in step (2-iii).
Since β2,l 6= α2,l, he generates (σ′l, σ′r) = (β2,l, σr) = (♥,♣) by overwriting the
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left element of (σl, σr) = (♣,♣) with β2,l = ♥ privately according to (5.5).
Bob sends (σ′l, σ
′
r) = (♥,♣) to Alice, and she obtains (cs, ds) := (♥,♣) due
to (5.6).
On the other hand, consider the case where Alice chooses w = r in step
(2-i); Then, she generates (σl, σr) = (ds, cs) = (♣,♣) from (5.4), and sends
it with α2,r = ♥ in step (2-iii). Since β2,l = α2,r, he generates (σ′l, σ′r) =
(σl, β2,l) = (♣,♥) by overwriting the right element of (σl, σr) = (♣,♣) with
β2,l = ♥ privately according to (5.5). Bob sends (σ′l, σ′r) = (♣,♥) to Alice,
and she obtains (cs, ds) := (♥,♣) due to (5.6).
Finally, the output value correctly becomes cs = ♥ as a < b regardless of
random choices of Alice.
Efficiency of Millionaires’ protocol II. This protocol requires two communi-
cations for every bit therefore it requires 2dlog de communications. We note
that steps (2-v) and (2-i), when i is incremented, can also be regarded as one
PP. Hence, this protocol requires 2dlog de + 1 PPs. The number of cards is
4dlog de+ 2.
Theorem 2 Millionaires’ protocol II is perfectly secure; it satisfies (2.7) in
Definition 1.
Proof: Consider the randomness used by Alice and Bob denoted by RA
and RB, respectively. From step (2-i), the value of RA = (W1,W2, . . . ,Wm)
where Wi is the random variable corresponding to w in the i-th loop in
step 2). Each random variable Wi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m takes the value in {l, r}
with probability 1/2, and it is independent from the other random variables.
Hence, RA can obviously be simulated by SA by using n independent uniform
binary numbers. Similarly to Millionaires’ protocol I, Bob does not use any
randomness, and hence, SB does not have to simulate RB.
Regarding the simulation of public information Λ, observe that Λ is
the m values represented by the face-up cards in step (2-iii), i.e., Λ =
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(α1,W1 , α2,W2 , . . . , αm,Wm). Hence, Λ is easily simulated by SA by a which is
represented by her 2m cards, and the random variableRA = (W1,W2, . . . ,Wm).
On the other hand, for Bob, Λ = (α1,W1 , α2,W2 , . . . , αm,Wm) seems to be uni-
formly distributed over {♥,♣}m since he does not know the value ofWi = wi,
which is selected randomly by Alice. Hence, Λ is easily simulated by SB.
Since the simulators SA and SB can be explicitly constructed as above,
we complete the proof of the theorem. □
5.3.3 Millionaires’ Problem Can Be Solved with Only
Six Cards
Although Millionaires’ protocol II was improved in terms of the numbers of
PPs and communications, as is shown in Table 5.1, it still requires the same
number of cards with the previous work based on logic gates. However, we
show that Millionaires’ protocol II can be realized with only six cards in this
section.
Our main idea is to reuse the card η discarded by Bob in step (2-iii) of
Protocol 12.*5 We note that, however, η cannot be simply reused. If η is
reused simply and accessed by Alice and/or Bob, they can obtain information
about η which holds information on their inputs. For instance, in Protocol 12,
suppose that Bob could look at the front of η in step (2-iii) for i = 1. Noticing
that (cs, ds) = (♣,♥) is public information when i = 1, a1 completely leaks
to Bob since he can tell whether w = l or not. Inductively, η should not
be simply reused when i ≥ 1 because η also holds information about Alice’s
choice of w.
Therefore, we need to erase information about η for reusing it. However,
it is impossible to erase the information about η as long as we adopt the
*5In our setting, the randomization for reusing η is executed by participants, Alice and
Bob. If we are allowed to outsource this randomization to a trusted third party, the
number of cards can further reduced, which was pointed out in [47].
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one-card representation since a single card cannot be randomized as opposed
to the case of two-card representation. Hence, we should employ two-card
representation for the storage (and the input) in Protocol 12. Concretely, if
η is in two-card representation, Bob returns randomized η to Alice instead
of discarding it by Bob in Protocol 12. Then, she can reuse η.
One may think that this modification makes the protocol inefficient since
the number of storage cards increases. However, surprisingly, this modifica-
tion allows Alice and Bob to use η as his/her inputs if they hold inputs in
their mind ! Namely, at the cost of using six cards for (cs, ds) and η, Alice
and Bob do not necessary to have their cards to represent their inputs (if
they can remember the inputs). Therefore, six cards are sufficient to realize a
card-based protocol for millionaires’ problem with efficient memory and com-
munication cost. The improved protocol shown in Protocols 13. As shown
in the step 1), the storage cards are represented by two-card representation.
The steps (2-v) and (2-viii) are executed for erasing information of η by Bob
and Alice.
Efficiency of the improvement of Millionaires’ protocol II. This protocol re-
quires two communications for every bit therefore it requires 2dlog de com-
munications. We note that the sequence of PPs executed in steps (2-iv) and
(2-v) can be regarded as one PP. Similarly, steps (2-vii) to (2-i), when i is
incremented, can also be regarded as one PP. Hence, this protocol requires
2dlog de+ 1 PPs.
5.4 Results and Discussion
This chapter proposed the following three efficient card-based protocols for
the millionaires’ problem by utilizing PP.
 Section 5.2: Millionaires’ protocol I (based on Yao’s solution [61])
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Protocol 13 Improvement of Millionaires’ Protocol II
1) Alice prepares two face-down ♣ and two face-down ♥ as the storage. First, let
cs = 0, ds = 0, i.e., cs and ds are expressed with two cards respectively. She also
prepares one ♣ and one ♥.
2) For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, repeat the following operations.
(2-i) Alice chooses αi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random privately. Then, execute the
following permutation:
(σl, σr) := PP
[4]
Rbc4
((cs, ds), χeq(αi, ai)) (5.7)
(2-ii) Alice turns remaining two cards face up and makes αi with them keeping on
face up.
(2-iii) Alice sends Bob (σl, σr) in addition to the two cards representing αi.
(2-iv) Bob compares bi with αi in his mind. If they are different, he replaces σl
with bi privately, otherwise he replaces σr with bi privately. Then, bi is
made of the two cards which is used for representing αi. This operation can
be described as the following PP with respect to Row26 := {π0, π1} where
π0 : (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7→ (1, 2, 5, 6, 3, 4) and π1 : (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7→ (5, 6, 3, 4, 1, 2):
(σ′l, σ
′
r, η) := PP
[6]
Row26
((σl, σr, bi), χeq(bi, αi)) (5.8)






where rb ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random.




(2-vii) Alice rearranges storage cards privately depending on the random value αi








which is used for the new storage cards (cs, ds).






where ra ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random.
3) Alice turns cs face up to output. If cs = 0, then a ≥ b. Otherwise, a < b. After
completing the protocol, ds is discarded without revealing.
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 Section 5.3.2: Millionaires’ protocol II
 Section 5.3.3: Improvement of Millionaires’ protocol II
Millionaires’ protocol I is constructed by directly converting Yao’s solution
into card-based cryptography. This result is due to bridge the gap between
algebraic MPC and card-based cryptography by introducing PP. This is the
first achievement of constructing a new card-based protocol by converting
algebraic MPC into card-based cryptography.*6 Millionaires’ protocol suc-
ceeded in improving the number of PPs and communications. However, the
number of cards exponentially increases from the existing protocol. It is
worth mentioning that millionaires’ protocol I is not only a direct transfor-
mation of Yao’s protocol but is also superior to the original protocol in the
sense that randomness and the announcement of the result are not required
as opposed to Yao’s original protocol.
Millionaires’ protocol II is entirely novel. It consists of the communication
of two types of storage for recording the compared result between two players.
This proposed protocol is superior to the existing protocol based on logic
gates with respect to the number of communications and PPs, whereas the
number of cards is the same as the existing protocol. Furthermore, it is
interesting to remark that millionaires’ protocol II and the well-known logic
puzzle known as “The fork in the road” are deeply related. However, this
protocol is not made efficient from the viewpoint of the number of cards (see
Table 5.1). Hence we proposed a method to reduce the number of cards.
The improved protocol works only six cards by memorizing the inputs in
players’ minds without representing them using cards.*7 This protocol is the
*6After the conference version of this work was published, the protocol based on Yao’s
solution was proposed in public model [30].
*7In our setting, the randomization for reusing η is executed by participants, Alice and
Bob. If we are allowed to outsource this randomization to a trusted third party, the
number of cards can further reduced, which was pointed out in [48].
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Traditional card-based cryptography is based on the assumption that all op-
erations are performed in public. Although this assumption has the advan-
tage of preventing cheats, it causes the lower bound of the number of cards
because it limits the input representation to use face-down cards. Also, tra-
ditional card-based cryptography utilizes “shuffle” to achieve confidentiality
in a situation where all operations are published. However, shuffle is based
on too card-oriented assumption, and thus it results that card-based cryptog-
raphy framework is different from algebraic MPC, which is based on “private
randomness.”
From the awareness of the above problem, we proposed a new card-based
cryptography model that is introduced a new operation, “private permuta-
tion (PP),” which is naturally derived from private randomness. The results
obtained by introducing PP are as follows:
Chapter 3: Card-based protocols for logic gates
PP allowed input values to be expressed without using face-down cards.
Chapter 3 focused on logic gates, which is the mainstream in previous work.
At least four cards were required to construct a logic gate protocol, but it
can be realized with a smaller number of cards by using PP as the input
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representation. The protocols proposed in Chapter 3 are as follows.
 Section 3.3.1: three-card OR protocol
 Section 3.3.2: two-card XOR protocol
Chapter 4: Card-based threshold function protocol
Chapter 3 succeeded in reducing the number of cards in the basic proto-
cols. Thus, Chapter focused on the more advanced function, the threshold
function. Then, it was a mainstream that advanced functions were realized
by a combination of logic gates. However, this general method has a problem
that the number of shuffles increases. Thus, we did not adopt this method
but a specific construction to improve efficiency. The protocols proposed in
Chapter 3 are as follows.
 Section 4.2: Simultaneous AND/OR protocol with four cards
 Section 4.2: 3-input majority voting protocol with four cards
 Section 4.3: (t, n)-threshold function protocol with n− 1 cards
Chapter 5: Card-based protocols for millionaires’ problem: PP re-
moved the card-oriented assumption of shuffle. As a result, card-based cryp-
tography framework became closer to algebraic MPC, and it became easier
to use techniques between them. We demonstrated that Yao’s algebraic mil-
lionaires’ protocol could be converted into a card-based protocol. Although
this protocol is improved in the viewpoint of the number of PPs and commu-
nications, the number of cards exponentially increases. Thus, we proposed
another millionaires’ protocol. This protocol was based on the bitwise com-
parison. Finally, we showed millionaires’ protocol could be realized with only
six cards. The interesting point of this protocol was to utilize the famous
logic puzzle “The fork in the road” in order to avoid information leaking in
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the bitwise comparison. This protocol was the most potent result of showing
the power of PP. The protocols proposed in Chapter 5 are as follows.
 Section 5.2: Millionaires’ protocol I (based on Yao’s solution [61])
 Section 5.3.2: Millionaires’ protocol II
 Section 5.3.3: Improvement of Millionaires’ protocol II
Finally, we describe the future work in the following.
 Generic construction in our model: We explained two directions for the
protocol construction, a generic one and a specialized one, in Section
1.1. All of our proposed protocols include in the generic construction.
Namely, it is not evident whether PP is also useful in generic construc-
tion, such as the combination of logic gates. Thus, it is required to
verify the usefulness by constructing generic protocols using PP. Then,
it is necessary to discuss the conditions for composing protocols se-
curely.
 New algebraic protocol based on card-based protocol: In this thesis, we
succeeded in obtaining a new card-based protocol by converting an
algebraic MPC protocol into a card-based protocol. However, there is
no example of creating a new algebraic MPC protocol from card-based
cryptography. Thus, it is a challenge to verify whether card-based
cryptography effectively contributes to the discovery of new algebraic
MPC protocols.
 Introduction of other private operations: In this thesis, we introduced
the only permutation as the private operation. On the other hand, we
can see other private operations by observing general card-games. For
instance, poker allows each player to look at the cards’ surface without
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showing it to other players. It is an interesting problem whether the
introduction of other private operations improves efficiency.
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List of Notations
Notation for Private Permutaion
 [t] := 1, 2, . . . , t for a positive integer t
 c⃗ ∈ {♣,♥}t: a vector consisting of t face-down cards
 Pt: a set of all permutations over [t]
 Rt: a subset of Pt
 PP
[t]
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